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THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Erik Mdse*
Torkel Opsahl**
INTRODUCTION
In Western and Western-influenced thinking the idea of
granting an international remedy to alleged victims of human
rights violations has been a leading one. Among those favoring
an effective protection of those rights, such a concept has
been regarded essential. However, political and legal difficul-
ties have at times appeared unsurmountable, particularly at
the global level.
Nevertheless, within the United Nations system, the Op-
tional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights is now formally in force.' The Protocol already
has a world-wide membership, including twenty-four of the
sixty-four States Parties to the Covenant.2 The Protocol is
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1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Pro-
tocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter referred
to as the Covenant and the Protocol] G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
16) 49, 49-60, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), were adopted by the General Assembly to-
gether with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on
December 16, 1966. Both the Covenant and the Protocol entered into force March 23,
1976, in accordance with Articles 49 of the Covenant and 9 of the Protocol, respec-
tively. 13 U.N. CHRON. (No. 1) 73 (1976).
2. As of October, 1980, according to information provided by the Secretariat of
the United Nations. Only States Parties to the Covenant may ratify or accede to the
Protocol. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 8. The present States Parties to the Pro-
tocol are: Barbados, Canada, Columbia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Madagascar, Mauritius, Netherlands, Nica-
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just beginning to function in practice. It is in some ways com-
parable to earlier regional mechanisms, but is still relatively
unknown. Yet this global effort deserves attention and already
offers a subject for practical study of procedures, compe-
tences, conditions, and developing practices.
The Protocol is a procedural measure for implementing
the Covenant, and as such, is only open to States bound by
the substantive obligations set forth in the Covenant. The
essence of the Protocol is expressed in its Preamble:
to enable the Human Rights Committee ... to receive
and consider, as provided in the present Protocol, com-
munications from individuals claiming to be victims of vi-
olations of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.3
The Human Rights Committee consists of eighteen na-
tionals of the States Parties to the Covenant elected by these
States for terms of four years, and serving in their individual
capacity.4 The Committee started its work in 1977.
As a procedural measure, the Protocol does not stand
alone, although it was written as a separate document. Apart
from the national measures of implementation required of
each State under the Covenant," there are other international
measures in the hands of the Committee. The Committee has
three main functions; one is obligatory for States Parties, and
two are optional:
1) to consider reports submitted by States Parties under Arti-
cle 40 of the Covenant on the measures they have adopted
ragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Senegal, Suriname, Sweden, Uruguay, Venezuela, and
Zaire.
3. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, Preamble.
4. Covenant, supra note 1, at 56, arts. 28 & 32. The Committee was elected by
secret ballot at the first meeting of the States Parties to the Covenant, held Septem-
ber 20, 1976 at the United Nations Headquarters. See Report of the Human Rights
Committee, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 44) 1, U.N. Doc. A/32/44 (1977) [hereinafter
referred to as Report I]. At the second meeting of September 18, 1978, nine members
were elected to replace those whose terms of office were to expire on December 31,
1978. Five members were re-elected. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, 34
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 40) 1, U.N. Doc. A/34/40 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as
Report III]. See also Report of the Human Rights Committee, 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 40) 1, U.N. Doec. A/33/40 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as Report II], and Re-
port of the Human Rights Committee, 35 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 40) 1, U.N. Dec.
A/35/40 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Report IV]. At the third meeting of the
States Parties on September 12, 1980, nine members were elected to replace the other
half of the original membership whose terms of office were to expire on December 31,
1980. Again, five members were re-elected. See U.N. Doec. CCPR/SP/SR.4 (1980).
5. Covenant, supra note 1, at 53, art. 2.
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which give effect to the rights recognized in the Covenant and
the progress made in the enjoyment of these rights (clearly
the main activity in its practice to date);'
2) to consider communications from one State claiming that
another State is not fulfilling its obligations, submitted under
the optional Article 41 (a procedure which so far has not been
applied);7
3) to consider communications from individuals under the
Optional Protocol.8
The competence of the Committee in this respect is regu-
lated by the provisions of Articles 1 through 5 in the Protocol.
After having considered the communication, the Committee
"shall forward its views to the State Party concerned and to
the individual." The annual report of the Committee shall
contain a summary of its activities under the Protocol.10
At its second session in 1977, the Committee began con-
sideration of the first communications which had arrived. By
the end of the tenth session, on August 1, 1980, seventy-two
communications had been placed before it for consideration.
The Committee had adopted its final views regarding six
communications. 1
6. A consideration of the reporting procedure falls outside the scope of this arti-
cle. It should be mentioned, however, that until August 1, 1980, 41 States had sub-
mitted initial reports under Article 40; see Report IV, supra note 4, at 6-7. Of these
reports, most have already been examined by the Committee in public meetings with
representatives of States answering orally. Some States have also submitted addi-
tional information in writing, this "dialogue" continuing in order to enable the Com-
mittee to formulate such "general comments" under Article 40 as it may wish. See
Report I, supra note 4, at 17-36, 67-68; Report II, supra note 4, at 8-97, 112-15; Re-
port III, supra note 4, at 14-103, 117-18; Report IV, supra note 4, at 6-87, 103-04.
7. The following 13 States have made a declaration under Article 41 of the Cov-
enant: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland,
Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. See Report IV, supra note 4, at 101. The
procedure is therefore formally in force, and relevant rules have been adopted by the
Committee in 1979. Report III, supra note 4, at 114.
8. The Committee so far has no other substantive functions than those referred
to above, and activities inherent to or developing from them. An important accessory
function follows from Article 45 of the Covenant, which provides that the Committee
shall submit to the General Assembly, through the Economic and Social Council, an
annual report on its activities. Covenant, supra note 1, at 58. See note 4 supra.
9. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 5(4).
10. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 6. The reports so far are the main source
about the work of the Committee, particularly regarding communications under the
Protocol, because the Committee examines these in closed meetings. Id. at art. 5(3).
11. See Report IV, supra note 4, at 93. For further details, see also text accom-
panying notes 242-60 infra.
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BACKGROUND
The history of the Protocol, closely linked to that of the
Covenants,1 2 began at the San Francisco Conference in 1945
with suggestions that the United Nations should establish an
"International Bill of Rights." s The stages of that history
moved from the United Nations Charter"1 via the Commission
on Human Rights, 8 which decided in 1947 that the bill to be
drafted should consist of a Declaration, a Convention (later
called Covenant) and Measures of Implementation. Mile-
stones were adopted by the General Assembly with the Uni-
versal Declaration on Human Rights December 10, 1948:6 the
decision by the Assembly in 1952 that there should be two
Covenants, one on Civil and Political Rights, the other on Ec-
onomic, Social and Cultural Rights, and that the provisions on
measures of implementation should be contained in the texts
of the two Covenants.1 7 In 1954 the Commission's drafts were
submitted to the Economic and Social Council and to the
General Assembly.
12. See, e.g., M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ch. VI
(1962); A. H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD (1972); L. SOHN, A Short
History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights, in 18TH REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE 39-186 (1968); Schwelb, Some as-
pects of the International Covenants on Human Rights of December 1966, in INTER-
NATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 103 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Schwelb,
Some aspects]; Schwelb, Notes on the early legislative history of the Measures of
Implementation of the Human Rights Covenants, in MELANGES OFFERTS A POLYS
MODINoS 270, 270-89 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Schwelb, Notes]; Schwelb, Civil and
Political Rights-the International Measures of Implementation, 62 AM. J. INT'L L.
827, 827-68 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Schwelb, Civil and Political Rights]; Schwelb,
Entry into Force of the International Covenants on Human Rights and the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 70 AM. J. INT'L
L. 511, 511-19 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Schwelb, Entry into Force]; Schwelb, The
International Measures of Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and of the Optional Protocol, 12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 141, 141-86
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Schwelb, International Measures].
13. See, e.g., H. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN
(1945).
14. The Charter refers to, but does not define human rights. A proposal to in-
corporate the Bill in the Charter itself was put forward but not proceeded with at the
San Francisco Conference. See A.H. ROBERTSON, supra note 12, at 25; Schwelb, Some
aspects, supra note 12, at 104-05.
15. See Schwelb, Some aspects, supra note 12, at 104-05; M. GANJI, supra note
12, at 141-42.
16. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948).
17. G.A. Res. 543, 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 36, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952);
G.A. Res. 547, 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 37, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952). See
Schwelb, Some aspects, supra note 12, at 105-06; M. GANJI, supra note 12, at 168-72.
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The 1954 Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
did not have any provision for an individual right of petition.
During the years of deliberations in the Commission on
Human Rights, several proposals to recognize the right to pe-
tition from individuals, groups and/or non-governmental orga-
nizations were made, but always rejected, usually by a small
majority."5 The major objection advanced was that this imple-
mentation procedure would interfere in the internal affairs of
States.
The Third Committee of the General Assembly devoted
its attention to the substantive provisions of the draft cove-
nants for many years and did not concentrate on implementa-
tion measures until 1966.11 At this session some delegations
proposed inserting in the Covenant an optional article en-
abling the Human Rights Committee to receive petitions from
individuals or groups of individuals.'0 However, it was decided
to include the substance of the proposed article in a separate
protocol. This made it possible for the General Assembly to
achieve the unanimous adoption of the Covenant and to adopt
the Protocol by a large majority although with many
abstentions.'
Before this stage was reached, discussion of the merits in
the Third Committee had shown considerable division of
opinion and very narrow vote margins in choosing between
the proposed optional article and the separate optional proto-
col. Third World countries tabled the main motions in the
Committee. Lebanon proposed a separate protocol, while Ni-
geria requested a roll-call vote on this motion and voted
against it. So did most Western States. The Eastern States,
on the contrary, voted in favor, and Lebanon's proposal was
adopted by a vote of forty-one to thirty-nine with sixteen ab-
stentions." Again Nigeria was active: having voted against the
18. See Schwelb, Notes, supra note 12, at 274, 276-79; M. GANJI, supra note 12,
at 179.
19. See Schwelb, Notes, supra note 12, at 283-86; A.H. RoBERTsoN, supra note
12, at 30-31.
20. See Schwelb, Civil and Political Rights, supra note 12, at 861; Schwelb,
International Measures, supra note 12, at 178-79; A.H. ROBERTSON, supra note 12, at
31; L. SOHN, supra note 12, at 164-69.
21. See 21 U.N. GAOR (1496th plen. mtg.) 1, 6, U.N. Doc. A/PU/1496 (1966).
The Covenant was adopted by 106 votes to none. The Protocol was adopted by 66
votes for, 2 against, and 38 abstentions.
22. Report of the Third Committee, 21 U.N. GAOR, I Annexes (Agenda Item
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separation from the Covenant, it nevertheless submitted, at
the very next meeting, the first draft of the Protocol.
We do not know exactly what occurred during the over-
night drafting process. Originally, the proposed optional
clause, Article 41 bis, in the Covenant,"3 apart from mention-
ing a few conditions of admissibility, said very little about the
procedure or competence of the Committee. To some extent it
was obviously inspired by the European Convention. When
some elements were added that are presently a part of the
Protocol, the changes must have been hurriedly made. This is
a factor to take into account when interpreting these
provisions.
However, the idea of a separate Protocol was not new.
The General Assembly itself had mentioned the concept in
1951 as an alternative to provisions in the Covenant itself.2'
At the same time, the Council of Europe adopted the optional
clause on individual petitions.
Although most of the delegations favoring the individual
right of petition would have preferred the clause rather than
the separate protocol, the merits of the choice were open to
doubt. The forecast that the existence of a separate protocol
"might even be more conducive to making the new institution
operative than an optional clause in a treaty"28 seems to have
been accurate. A comparison with the optional clause on indi-
vidual petition in the Racial Discrimination Convention,
which has not entered into force for lack of acceptance despite
many more ratifications of the Convention itself, and also
with the fate of Article 41 of the Covenant, lends support to
this view.
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE RELEVANT SOURCES
When discussing the legal aspects of the system under the
Protocol, one must consider three main sources. Besides the
Protocol itself, and the Covenant which the Protocol is to im-
plement as one among other measures, the system is also gov-
erned by the Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Com-
62) 7, 51, U.N. Doc. A/6546 (1966).
23. Id. at 50-51, pares. 474-77.
24. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 421 F, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 43, U.N. Doc. A/
1775 (1950).
25. See Schwelb, International Measures, supra note 12, at 179-80.
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mittee. However, as in all living systems, the written law will
be supplemented and even modified by precedent, i.e.,
through practices and decisions in individual cases. Factors
other than the texts of the three actual instruments are influ-
ential: the policies of those acting; their conceptions of the
objectives of the system; and constraints such as inadequate
resources and other indirect pressures. This is not, however,
the place to discuss the juridical relevance of such factors or
similar problems of method.
Returning to the three written instruments, the Protocol
is of course the most important source for the consideration of
communications. The substantive rights and freedoms stated
in the Covenant are the basis for alleged violations submitted
under the Protocol. In addition, some of the procedural and
organizational provisions in the Covenant also apply to the
Committee when it examines communications.'" Thirdly, the
Rules of Procedure are of major importance, especially Chap-
ter XVII on the procedure for the consideration of communi-
cations received under the Protocol.2 7
In law, a crucial difference exists between the Covenant
and Protocol on the one hand, and the Rules on the other.
The former have created the Committee and its competence,
and are at the same time limiting and binding on it; but the
Rules are created by the Committee itself and their effects are
thus, in principle, different. The Rules mainly affect parties,
the Secretariat, the officers, and individual members. They
are not binding on the Committee as such in the same way as
the Covenant and Protocol.28
The Rules of Procedure are established by the Committee
by virtue of the Covenant." Moreover, the entire Covenant as
26. See Covenant, supra note 1, at 57, art. 39(2)(a) (twelve members shall con-
stitute a quorum) and id. art. 39(2)(b) (decisions by majority vote). These provisions
are also reflected in the Rules; see, e.g., Report I, supra note 4, rules 37 & 51. But see
notes 200-01 and accompanying text infra (regarding "consensus" as a normal
method of work of the Committee).
27. Report I, supra note 4, rules 78-94. A major and very valuable study to
which various references will be made in the following, is Bossuyt, Le Rfglement in-
t~rieur du Comit des Droits de L'Homme, 14 REvux BELGE DE Dsorr INT'L 104
(1978-79). See id. at 130-52 concerning chapter XVII of the Rules and relevant Arti-
cles of the Protocol.
28. Many Rules are subject to the clause "unless otherwise decided by the Com-
mittee." Report I, supra note 4, rule 46. See id. rule 65, concerning amendments "by
a decision of the Committee" without formal requirements.
29. Article 39(2) grants the Committee this competence and contains some posi-
19811
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well as the Protocol must be considered as lex superior to the
Rules of Procedure." Using both positive and negative lan-
guage, these two instruments limit the Committee's freedom
of action when drafting its Rules of Procedure. If there is a
contradiction between the Rules on the one hand and the
Covenant or the Protocol on the other, the latter will prevail.
This is the point of departure. In practice, however, the
question at issue will often be whether there exists a contra-
diction or not. Sometimes it may be obvious that the Protocol
contains a lacuna, so that the Committee is free to solve the
problem at its discretion. In other situations the Protocol
must be so interpreted that it requires a certain solution. The
difficulty is to distinguish between contradicting the Protocol,
which is prohibited, and supplementing it, which is permitted.
A general answer to this question hardly exists. Some
general comments may, however, be made. In principle, this is
a question of interpretation of each provision concerned. The
Protocol as well as the Rules must be construed in conformity
with ordinary legal methods.
When interpreting the Protocol one should take into con-
sideration the situation and manner in which it was drafted. 1
In fact, this instrument came into being within a few days and
its provisions are not always clear and logical. In our opinion
these factors are arguments in favor of a rather free interpre-
tation of its provisions.One important point is already settled in practice. The
Committee has agreed that the order in which the Articles are
presented in the Protocol should not be interpreted to reflect
a chronological order of the procedures to be followed. The
Protocol lays down the conditions for admissibility but does
not establish the procedure to be followed in determining
admissibility.3 2
The efficient functioning of the system provided for
tive requirements as to the contents of these Rules.
30. The relations between the Covenant and the Protocol will not be dealt with
here. Conflicts between these two instruments will hardly occur, but sometimes when
the provisions of the Protocol depend on those of the Covenant, doubts may arise as
to the exact position. Compare Covenant, supra note 1, at 53, art. 2, with Protocol,
supra note 1, at 59, art. 1, regarding the question of territory. See text accompanying
notes 143-47 infra.
31. See text accompanying notes 12-25 supra.
32. See Report I, supra note 4, at 11; see also text accompanying notes 75-190
infra.
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under the Protocol should also be considered an important
purpose when interpreting the relevant instruments. On
points where it is silent, or obviously incomplete, the Protocol
should not be seen to bar any pragmatic solution which may
be laid down by the Committee in its Rules or in a decision,
provided that basic principles are observed. Nor should the
Protocol be automatically interpreted a contrario, e.g., when
it says that the Committee "shall" do this or that,"s or as not
providing authority to solve practical problems unforeseen at
the adoption of the Protocol. In particular, this pragmatic ap-
proach applies to procedural steps and conditions which may
be necessary to adopt, since the Protocol generally has left
such matters to the Committee.' The Protocol has, of course,
implied or inherent limits, e.g., in the rights of States Parties,
but a considerable space for supplementing the Protocol
nevertheless seems to exist.
Such general guidelines as those suggested above may
seem rather vague. Thus, the problem of "contradiction or
supplement" ultimately must be solved in concreto. Some
illustrations will be addressed in later portions of this arti-
cle.3 5 In discussion about interpretations and proposals within
the Committee, widely differing approaches to the matters re-
ferred to may appear. There is a strict constructionist school,
to which many declare themselves to belong and which few
33. See, e.g., Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 5(1). That the Committee has a
duty to ("ghall") take into account "all written information" submitted by the par-
ties, does not exclude in our view that it also may consider information obtained
orally, i.e., at hearings or fact-finding missions, at least when arranged with the con-
sent of the party or parties concerned. On the other hand, it is not bound by any
directive in the Protocol to do so, and unlike the European Convention Article
28(1)(a) the parties are not bound to cooperate if it decides to try. See European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 2889 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter cited as European Convention]. The problem of
such "inherent powers" in the procedure would, however, seem to deserve a further
study.
34. See note 32 supra.
35. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 90-98 infra, concerning the questions of
the interpretation of "views" in Article 5(4), of oral or written procedure, and of fact-
finding missions. See text accompanying notes 187-89 & 192-93 infra concerning the
extent of the reference as regards "unreasonable prolongation" in Article 5(2)(b), and
the question of a time limit for the submission of communications after the exhaus-
tion of domestic remedies. It should be noted that the problem of the limitation of
the Committee's competence also occurs when it acts in concerto. In this situation
not only the Covenant and the Protocol, but also the Rules may, in principle, limit
the Committee's freedom of action. But see note 28 and accompanying text supra.
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SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
openly dare to oppose, rejecting suggestions about the Com-
mittee's functions as ultra vires.
Generally, unanimity prevails about the Covenant and
Protocol as the Committee's constitution and basis of its
work. This frail consensus is important as oil in the machinery
of a body where so many interests and ideologies meet. A need
seems to make itself felt, therefore, to conceal the "freer" in-
terpretations and argue as if one keeps to the letter of the
Protocol.
A SUMMARY OF THE PROCEDURE UNDER THE PROTOCOL
Before taking up the legal questions arising under the
Protocol, it will be useful to describe the communications pro-
cedure from a practical viewpoint and refer to the relevant
Rules.
In the mass of communications arriving to the United
Nations on human rights matters, those few which are or ap-
pear to be submitted for consideration by the Committee are
registered "by the Secretary-General" and then transmitted
to the Committee. 6 However, communications concerning a
state which is not a Party to the Protocol are not transmitted
to the Committee. 7 Before transmission, the Secretariat may,
when necessary, solicit clarifications from the author if the in-
formation furnished appears insufficient, 88 or where it is un-
clear whether the author wants the communication considered
by the Committee. 9 If it turns out that the author wants such
a consideration, or if there are still doubts as to his wish, the
communication will be transmitted to the Committee. The
function ascribed to the Secretary-General under the Rules is
therefore mainly of an administrative and technical nature.
He has no "pre-screening competence" to reject a communica-
36. Report I, supra note 4, rule 78(1). In practice, the Communications Unit in
the Division of Human Rights, at the Geneva office, performs these tasks on behalf of
the Secretary-General who, of course, is stationed in New York. The function of
separating communications, distributing and channelling them to the appropriate
bodies, is an important one. Unfortunately, delays are caused, in part because the
Unit is seriously understaffed, but also inevitably, because of the administrative
arrangements.
37. Id. rule 78(3). Communications concerning a state which is not a Party to
the Protocol are not registered. See id. rules 79(1) & 78(3). This is in line with Article
1 in fine of the Protocol.
38. Id. rule 80.
39. Id. rule 78(2).
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tion even if it is clearly inadmissible on formal or substantive
grounds.40
In order to facilitate consideration by the Committee of
the communications submitted to it, a Working Group usually
meets prior to and during the sessions of the Committee. 41
When the Committee begins each session under the Protocol,
it is presented with lists of communications with a brief sum-
mary of their contents,"" fact sheets for each of them contain-
ing a more detailed description of the contents,'3 any addi-
tional written information submitted by the parties, and
finally, the recommendations from the Working Group. 4 At
each session there are communications brought to the atten-
tion of the Committee for the first time, as well as communi-
cations previously pending before the Committee.45
The Committee's considerations take place in closed
meetings."' Unless the communication can clearly be rejected
as "inadmissible" at once, the procedure must extend over
more than one session and is divided into two main stages: 1)
the admissibility of the communication, and, only if admis-
sibility is found, 2) the merits of the communication.
It is probably implied in the Protocol, and is explicitly
stated in the Rules, that the Committee must first decide
whether a communication is admissible under the Protocol,
i.e., whether the Committee is competent to deal with the
matter according to the positive and negative conditions laid
down in the Protocol.7 That the two stages should be clearly
40. It is otherwise only if the communication concerns a state which is not a
Party. See Bossuyt, supra note 27, at 130-33. Bossuyt criticizes rule 78(3) as in fact
giving the Secretary-General the competence to take a decision on admissibility, this
being the only exception from the general rule which leaves admissibility decisions
exclusively to the Committee itself. The exception was included because it appeared
clear and cannot apply in case of complications as those envisaged by Bossuyt (if it
concerns several States, or a State having denounced the Protocol after the events
complained of).
41. Report I, supra note 4, rule 89.
42. Id. rule 79.
43. Id. rule 81. These sheets are distributed for each case and are based on the
submissions of the authors.
44. Id. rules 89, 94.
45. These points appear from the annotations to the provisional agenda of the
Committee. See, e.g., Prov. Agenda (9th Sess.) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/11, Jan. 7, 1980, at
4.
46. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 5(3); Report I, supra note 4, rule 82.
47. See id. rule 87. These conditions are dealt with in the text accompanying
notes 112-96 infra. This is also the system of the European Commission of Human
1981]
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separated, not only in law, but also in time, seems to follow
from the dictates both of legal logic, the competence to act
being a precondition for acting, and of procedural economy.
Yet it is not an unmixed blessing.
If the Committee decides that the communication is inad-
missible, 8 that is the end. The decision is, in principle, final
and no further steps are taken under the Protocol.'9 The
Committee must, of course, communicate its decision to those
concerned, and shall do so as soon as possible.50 It always goes
to the author of the communication, and the State Party con-
cerned gets it if the communication has already been trans-
mitted to it for additional written information or observations
on admissibility.51 One should note that transmission to the
State Party at this stage is not obligatory and may be omitted
where inadmissibility follows from the communication as sub-
mitted by the author. The decision then only has to be com-
municated to the author. In any event, the decisions declaring
communications inadmissible may be referred to in the Com-
mittee's annual report. The question of giving further public-
ity to them has been raised but not settled.5'
When a communication is declared admissible, the deci-
sion and the text of the relevant documents are submitted to
the State concerned.58 The author is informed of the deci-
sion." It should be noted that the communication may not be
declared admissible unless the State Party concerned has re-
ceived the text of the communication and has been given an
opportunity to furnish information or observations." Al-
though the admissibility decision does not prejudge the merits
of the case, it may, procedurally, be seen as a decision against
the State Party. Experience in similar organs has shown that
States usually wish to contest admissibility rather than, or
Rights; see, e.g., O'Boyle, Practice and Procedure Under the European Convention,
20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 697 (1980).
48. A more detailed analysis of the various possible decisions is discussed in the
text accompanying notes 196-219 infra.
49. The Committee may, subject to certain conditions, reconsider its decision.
See generally text accompanying notes 217-19 infra.
50. Report I, supra note 4, rule 92(1).
51. Id. rule 91.
52. See text accompanying notes 252-53 infra.
53. Report I, supra note 4, rule 93.
54. Id. rule 92(1).
55. Id. rule 91(2).
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before entering into, the merits. Thus, giving the State Party
an opportunity to respond may be viewed as a safeguard and
a reflection of the principle of hearing both parties.5" Such a
hearing is less necessary in cases declared inadmissible.
The consideration of the merits of an admissible case is
briefly envisaged by Articles 4 and 5 of the Protocol. Within
six months, the State shall submit written explanations or
statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that
may have been taken by that State.5 7 This information is then
communicated to the author who may submit additional writ-
ten information or observations within a time limit decided by
the Committee." The Committee considers the communica-
tion in light of all written information made available to it by
the author and the State concerned and then formulates its
views on the merits of the case according to the provisions of
Article 5 of the Protocol." These views are communicated to
the individual and the State. They may also be published and
included in the annual report.6
The procedure outlined here was laid down by the Rules
and has been applied in a number of cases since 1977. Since it
is necessarily time-consuming, this procedure has not un-
equivocally confirmed its advantages. Because the Protocol it-
self does not distinguish between the two stages so clearly as
the Rules of Procedure, and may even be read in a way that
would obliterate the distinction, at least in part, the Rules are
open to further discussion and possible improvement.
SOME QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE
A primary matter of principle is the status of the Com-
mittee, particularly when it is exercising its functions under
the Protocol. As mentioned above,61 the Committee is estab-
lished by and derives its competence from the Covenant and
the Protocol. Neither the Committee as a body, nor a member
56. See text accompanying notes 76-82 infra.
57. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 4(2); see also Report I, supra note 4, rule
93(2). In practice, Article 4(2) has been interpreted to the effect that it applies only
to the stage where the merits are considered, and not to the admissibility stage. How-
ever, the principle that both parties shall be heard before making a decision is also
reflected at the initial stage. See notes 54 & 56 supra.
58. Report I, supra note 4, rule 93(3).
59. Id. rule 94(1). See Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 5(4).
60. See text accompanying notes 109 & 242-50 infra.
61. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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individually, is responsible to any other institution. The only
organ that, in a sense, is superior to the Committee is the
meeting of the States Parties, at which the Committee mem-
bers are elected.62 Whether the. meeting may exercise addi-
tional or inherent powers in its electoral capacity or assume
other functions has not yet been explored. It does not seem to
be intended that such a meeting should act as a representa-
tive of the collectivity of States Parties in matters of sub-
stance, e.g., by issuing instructions binding the Committee.
The Committee is not, in any event, a United Nations organ;
it is an independent body established under an instrument
distinct from the United Nations Charter.
On the other hand, the Committee is attached to the
United Nations in various respects. The Secretary-General
provides the necessary staff and facilities for the effective per-
formance of the functions of the Committee,as and also has
several administrative functions." The members of the Com-
mittee receive emoluments from the United Nations sources
with the approval of the General Assembly, 5 and the annual
report of the Committee is submitted to the General Assem-
bly.0 6 This creates a dilemma: while the Committee is an inde-
pendent body outside the United Nations hierarchy, it is de-
pendent on resources made available by the General Assembly
and the Secretariat.6 7 When discussing some of the problems
arising under the Protocol, this situation should be kept in
mind.
One should also note the Committee's "geographical"
62. See Covenant, supra note 1, at 56, arts. 30(4), 32(2) & 34(2).
63. Id. art. 36.
64. See id. at 56-58, arts. 30 (elections); 33, 34 (vacancies); 40 (submission and
transmission of reports) and 48-53 (final provisions). See also Protocol, supra note 1,
at 59-60 arts. 8-14.
65. Covenant, supra note 1, at 56, art. 35. This system differs from the one
established under the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination (CERD). See Int'l Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
66. See notes 4, 8, & 10, supra.
67. The Committee may wish to be heard, e.g., about its needs as regards re-
sources for the effective performance of its functions, or consult, as it has occasionally
done, with the Legal Adviser of the U.N. Yet the Committee will probably jealously
guard its own independence. Concern to preserve this independence was also a main
reason why the Third Committee decided not to invite the Chairman of the Human
Rights Committee to introduce its first annual report in 1977, despite a suggestion by
the Committee itself. See Report I, supra note 4, at 44, para. 185.
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scope of activity" where the view is sometimes expressed that
the Committee is a "universal" institution. While this is not
presently the case, the Covenant has universal aspirations.
Only about two-fifths of the member states of the United Na-
tions have ratified or. acceded to the Covenant. On the other
hand, many influential members have done so, and almost
every region and political system existing in the world is rep-
resented among the States Parties as well as in the Commit-
tee. The Committee may therefore already be described gen-
erally as a global body. Yet the particular aspect of the system
of implementation laid down in the Protocol, to which only
twenty-four States have adhered, is at this moment much
more narrowly applicable.
Further questions of principle arise when one asks what
sort of implementation by the Committee is envisaged. There
are two main attitudes represented both in the world and in
the United Nations regarding implementation of human
rights. Many States show a preference for the promotion of
human rights, which implies action directed towards the fu-
ture, e.g., studies, research, and recommendations. The con-
tinuing process to define and develop the concept of human
rights could be seen in this perspective. Others advocate the
protection of human rights, i.e., to ensure that they are ob-
served - as established - through sanctions. The aim of this
latter group traditionally has been to set up some type of judi-
cial machinery. In particular, the protectionist interest has fo-
cused on the action taken by the institutions on individual pe-
titions, such as those envisaged under the Protocol.
Having in mind these two schools of implementation, one
could try to describe the task of the Committee under the
Protocol. Is it a body for the promotion or the protection of
human rights? The drafters of the relevant instruments have
avoided this issue. 9 According to the neutral language of the
Covenant, the Committee "shall carry out the functions here-
inafter provided. ' ' 70 No further characterization of the tasks of
the Committee is given, either in the Covenant or in the Pro-
68. As to the concepts discussed here, see Vasak, National, Regional, and Uni-
versal Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 1 REVUE DES
DsorrS DE L'HOMME 164, 165 (1968).
69. Since the text is silent, a pragmatic view should be taken. See text accom-
panying notes 220-41 & 259 infra.
70. Covenant, supra note 1, at 55, art. 28.
1981]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
tocol itself.
The relations between "universalism" and "regionalism"
in the international work for human rights have been dis-
cussed several times and from different perspectives. Evaluat-
ing the systems at different levels, a regional approach may be
expected to increase the possibility of achieving common stan-
dards and efficient procedures of implementation. At the same
time, it is often stressed that the contents of human rights in
principle should be "universal." Although this aspect cannot
be elaborated upon in this article, we think it is arguable that
a division of functions between the global and regional level
should emerge, the former concentrating on the promotion of
human rights, the latter mainly dealing with protection. 1
When several instruments, general or special, exist in the
same field, the problem of co-existence arises, irrespective of
geographical level. The convergencies and divergencies be-
tween the substantive rights protected, e.g., both by the pre-
existing European Convention and the Covenant, have been
the subject of several studies, the method usually being that
of comparison. In this context, however, some of the relations
between the implementation procedures are of particular in-
terest. This is the case when an individual submits a commu-
nication, not only under the Protocol, but also by virtue of
some other instrument, such as the European Convention.72
Another dimension is the interaction between the various
instruments. 8 Such interaction can be seen not only in the
"legislative process" (e.g., widening the scope of an existing
instrument by drafting new substantive rights which are men-
tioned elsewhere, or improving the procedure with regard to
other systems), but also when an instrument is applied by the
competent organ (e.g., other instruments may have an impact
through renvoi or as means of interpretation). When examin-
ing the system under the Protocol, several examples of influ-
ence from other instruments can be found. The Rules of Pro-
cedure, for instance, are to a large extent inspired by those
71. Some justification for such a view is advanced by Opsahl, The Protection of
Human Rights in the Council of Europe and in the United Nations, 26 EuR. Y.B. 92,
115-17 (1980).
72. See text accompanying notes 176-89 infra.
73. Some aspects are dealt with in the Proceedings of the Colloquy about the
European Convention on Human Rights in Relation to Other International Instru-
ments for the Protection of Human Rights, Athens, September 21-22 (1978).
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drawn up by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination (CERD). Also, some of the rules provided for in
regional systems have been of interest.7 The experience and
practice under the European Convention on Human Rights on
similar points has been taken into consideration by the Com-
mittee acting under the Protocol, especially when establishing
its procedures, and through contacts at the Secretariat level.
On the other hand, the practice of the Committee has had an
impact on the activities of other institutions. 5
It is a well-established principle of procedure that both
parties shall be heard before a decision is made (audiatur et
altera pars), the aim being that all necessary information
shall be available. This principle also applies to the proceed-
ings under the Protocol. 6 When the Committee considered its
Rules of Procedure, it agreed that it was under no obligation
under the Protocol to transmit at the admissibility stage the
text of the communication to the State concerned 7 7 but it de-
cided nevertheless that no communication shall be declared
admissible unless the State has received the text of the com-
munication and has been given the opportunity to furnish in-
formation or observations relevant to its admissibility.7 8 There
is no provision prescribing that the information and observa-
tions received from the State shall be transmitted to the au-
thor of the communication for additional comments,7 but in
practice this is normally done.
The communication shall be brought to the attention of
the State Party concerned, "subject to the provisions of
Article 3," which refers to inadmissible communications.8
The Committee therefore has interpreted this duty as only
applicable to the merits. In other words, the Protocol ex-
74. See Bossuyt, supra note 27, at 108, 152-55.
75. Id. at 116, note 39, describing how the liberal attitude of the Committee
regarding the distribution of documents has influenced the practice under CERD.
The influence of the Committee will probably increase when the system of individual
communication under CERD Article 14 enters into force.
76. See text accompanying notes 51-56 supra.
77. Report I, supra note 4, at 13.
78. Id. rule 91(2). On the other hand the Committee may declare a communica-
tion inadmissible without having transmitted it to the State concerned, since the
State usually has no interest in being informed of such communication. See, e.g., id.
rule 92(1). The Committee is, however, not excluded from transmitting such commu-
nications, if it so wishes.
79. This is criticized by Bossuyt, supra note 27, at 148.
80. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 4.
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pressly provides for the principle that both parties have the
right to be heard before the final views on the merits are
adopted."'
Obviously a balance must be struck between the effective
application of the principle audiatur et altera pars, on the
one hand, and the need for the Committee to act as expedi-
tiously as possible. The Protocol does not expressly provide
for a second round from the author, and in any event the
Committee must, sooner or later, bring the exchange between
the parties to an end. 2 During the discussion of the Rules of
Procedure, the Committee members differed on whether one
should provide for other general time-limits and their even-
tual extent. It was finally decided not to lay down general
time-limits,83 but instead a flexible system was chosen. A
time-limit is fixed in each case for the submission of observa-
tions on admissibility84 and for the additional written infor-
mation regarding the merits.88 Later general decisions on the
length of time-limits have nevertheless been applied.86 In view
of the long intervals between the Committee meetings, this so-
lution may entail delays. Yet proposals to authorize the Secre-
tary-General, on behalf of the Committee, to seek information
or observations between sessions were rejected.87 Therefore,
the situation permits considerable time to pass from the mo-
ment when the communication is submitted until the Com-
mittee adopts its final views.88 A crucial question arises: What
action, if any, may be taken by the Committee to meet an
81. This is repeated in rule 93(3), which also states that any explanations or
statements submitted by the State shall be transmitted to the author who may sub-
mit additional written information; See Report I, supra note 4, rule 93(3). The latter
provision leaves it to the author whether he wants to do so ("may"), but for the State,
under rule 93(2), the mandatory term of the Protocol ("shall") is repeated. Id.
82. However, the only time-limit provided for in the Protocol is the six months
rule in Article 4(2), within which the State must submit written explanations or
statements.
83. Report I, supra note 4, at 13-14.
84. Report I, supra note 4, rule 91(1).
85. Id. rule 93(3).
86. See text accompanying note 202 infra.
87. Report I, supra note 4, at 14. The arguments were that "delegating" such
(procedural) powers "might be construed as unconstitutional under the Protocol and
it might be unacceptable to the Secretary-General." Id. para. 79. This is not entirely
convincing to these authors.
88. In the two first cases, referred to in text accompanying notes 244-52 infra,
the time taken was respectively, two and a half years, and two years and eight
months.
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individual's request during the interim?
The Protocol contains no express provision on this prob-
lem, but the Committee may, prior to forwarding its final
views, inform the State concerned of its views whether in-
terim measures may be desirable to avoid irreparable damage
to the alleged victim.89 This prudent formulation was chosen
because several members considered Article 5(4) of the Proto-
col" as being a limitation of the competence of the Commit-
tee, not only regarding final views, but other "views" as well,
such as recommendations on interim measures.91 The present
wording and the Committee discussions thereon leave the is-
sue open to doubt as to whether the Committee may forward
its views on interim measures not only after the communica-
tion has been declared admissible, but also at the initial
stage.92 If not, the purpose of avoiding damage to the victim
would easily be defeated, in view of the time usually spent on
the admissibility stage.
The Committee shall consider the communication in the
light of all written information made available to it by the in-
dividual and by the State Party concerned.98 It might seem to
follow from this provision that all the proceedings concerning
communications have to be in writing." It is nevertheless in
our view an open question whether the Committee may pro-
vide for oral proceedings in its Rules of Procedure.9 The pre-
sent Rules only mention written information and how it shall
be obtained.96 Yet the Rules are not very elaborate and draw
no distinctions, for instance, between evidence and legal sub-
missions. Experience may indicate that such issues ought to
be further developed. One could argue that oral proceedings
may, when required, at least be arranged with the consent of
89. Report I, supra note 4, rule 86.
90. Article 5(4) of the Protocol provides: "The Committee shall forward its
views to the State Party concerned and to the individual."
91. According to the draft, the Committee or its subsidiary body could at any
time request a State Party to take interim measures to avoid irreparable damage to a
victim of an alleged violation.
92. See Bossuyt, supra note 27, at 135.
93. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 5(1).
94. See Schwelb, Civil and Political Rights, supra note 12, at 867. By way of
contrast, Article 41(1)(g) of the Covenant gives States Parties the right to make sub-
missions orally and/or in writing.
95. See Covenant, supra note 1, at 56-57, art. 39.
96. Report'I, supra note 4, rules 91(1), (2), 92(2), 93(2), (3). See also text ac-
companying note 33 supra.
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the parties. Until present all proceedings have been in writing.
The additional question of how to verify - by means of written
procedure - the information submitted by the author when
contested by the respondent State, will be of increasing im-
portance in the future.97 What is at stake is the whole fact-
finding function, crucial to any inquiry aiming at objectivity.9"
The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examin-
ing communications."9 Meetings in camera are an exception
from the main rule providing for public meetings. 00 The rea-
son for this exception is partly "to protect States .... from
having all sorts of accusations, sometimes totally groundless,
brought into the full glare of publicity, with the world press as
an observer."'' To some extent, this Rule could also serve the
interests of the alleged victim and enables the Committee
freely to discuss the matter.10 2
A problem distinct from the publicity of meetings is the
issue of the publicity of documents.0 8 Summary records of
private meetings are distributed to the Committee members
and the participants in the meeting. They may be made avail-
able to others upon decision of the Committee at such time
and under such circumstances as the Committee may de-
cide. 0 4 This principle of restricted distribution also applies to
other official documents of the Committee and its subsidiary
bodies relating to the Protocol (e.g., reports and formal deci-
sions). Such documents shall be distributed to all members of
the Committee, to the States Parties concerned, and, if so de-
cided by the Committee, to members of its subsidiary bodies
97. The second case in which final views were adopted clearly illustrates the
problem of establishing the facts when specific written allegations are refuted merely
in general terms, and resulted in divided opinions in the Committee. See text accom-
panying notes 242-50 infra.
98. Both the Protocol and the Covenant are silent as to the possibility of fact-
finding missions. Whether in the future this will be interpreted as a lacuna or a prohi-
bition due to lack of competence remains to be seen.
99. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 5(3). This provision is repeated in Rule 82,
which also prescribes that the Committee may decide to hold public meetings when
considering general issues relating to communications. Report I, supra note 4, rule 22.
100. Report I, supra note 4, rule 33.
101. F. CASTBERO, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 15 (1974). The
expression explains the purpose of the similar rule regarding the European
Commission.
102. With a system of oral procedure, this solution is less evident. A distinction
may then be drawn between (public) hearings and deliberations (in camera).
103. See Bossuyt, supra note 27, at 112-19; Report I, supra note 4, at 8-10.
104. Report I, supra note 4, rule 36.
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and others concerned.105 This is an exception from the main
rule of general distribution of Committee documents.'"s Infor-
mation from a State Party is usually contained in documents
of general distribution, unless the State requests otherwise. 10
The Committee forwards its views to the State concerned
and to the individual.105 None of the instruments has any ex-
press provision regarding whether the Committee may make
these views known to groups other than the parties. If not, it
would be up to the parties to control publicity, and it might
become very difficult for others to trace the information. 109
Therefore, the Committee has decided to publish it in the an-
nual report in every instance since it for the first time con-
cluded its considerations of a communication by adopting its
final views.110 The Committee has also decided to publish a
press release on such occasions.
Public meetings and publication and distribution of docu-
ments are means to achieve publicity for the work of the
Committee. Generally speaking, publicity is important for the
purpose of informing and educating the public about human
rights. With respect to the system under the Protocol one
should also not overlook the function of publicity as a "sanc-
tion" mobilizing public opinion."
ADMISSIBILITY: CONDITIONS
The first duty of the Committee under the Protocol is de-
termining whether a communication is admissible.' This is
not merely a simple check of formal requirements. The con-
105. Id. rule 64(2). Although it might seem that both Rule 36 and Rule 64(2)
could be made use of as a basis for involving "others" in closed meetings-victims,
authors, etc.-these general provisions of the availability of documents cannot be de-
cisive as regards the functions of the Committee under the Protocol. In particular,
Rule 64(3) is clearly unsuitable to documents relating to communications.
106. Id. rule 64(1).
107. Id. rule 64(3).
108. See Protocol supra note 1, at 59, art. 5(4). Report I, supra note 4, rule
94(2).
109. However Article 6 states that the annual report shall contain a summary of
the activities under the Protocol. This provision has been interpreted to the effect
that the final views in a case may be published in the report. Protocol, supra note 1,
at 59, art. 6.
110. See Report III, supra note 4, at 124; Report IV, supra note 4, at 107, 111,
120-21, 127 & 130.
111. See text accompanying notes 254-55 infra.
112. See text accompanying notes 36-60 supra.
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cept of admissibility as it is developing in practice covers
many matters, sometimes very complicated and delicate.
Other experience suggests that it may become the major ob-
stacle where the overwhelming number of cases fail."' In any
event, the concept raises many legal issues.
The unity of this concept 14 is perhaps somewhat theoret-
ical or even artificial. The conditions of admissibility are
found in the Protocol'" and, in a restated form, in the
Rules,11 a but the terms employed in these provisions vary.11 7
The conditions of admissibility are, to some extent, simi-
lar to those applied by the European Commission of Human
Rights. The Protocol mentions fewer admissibility conditions.
In its examination of individual applications, the Commission
has established a certain hierarchical order in which the dif-
113. See THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, STOCK-TAKING ON THE EUROPEAN CONVEN-
TION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 137 (1979). Of a total of 8072 individual cases (applications
decided in the years 1955-1978), only 190, or about 2.3% were declared admissible,
while the others were either inadmissible or struck off the list.
114. See, e.g., Report I, supra note 4, rule 87.
115. Protocol, supra note 1, arts. 1-3, 5(2).
116. Report I, supra note 4, rule 90.
117. Article 3 provides that the Committee "shall consider inadmissible" (em-
phasis added) a communication in certain circumstances, mentioning three separate
grounds. The other provisions in the Protocol regulating the Committee's competence
do not, however, use the terms admissible/inadmissible. According to Article 1, a
State Party "recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider,"
(emphasis added) subject to certain conditions, communications from individuals.
"No communication shall be received" (emphasis added) if it concerns a state which
is not a Party to the present Protocol. Article 2 again has a different formulation
("may submit a written communication") (emphasis added) as has Article 5(2) ("shall
not consider unless") (emphasis added). It is therefore arguable that a distinction has
to be drawn between grounds barring the receipt, the admissibility, and the consider-
ation of a communication. On the other hand, the main legal effect of the existence of
any of these grounds remains the same, in that the Committee will not embark upon
a consideration of the merits. Seen in this perspective, not only Article 3, but also
Articles 1, 2, and 5(2) contain conditions of admissibility. This has been the approach
of the Committee. See Report I, supra note 4, rules 87, 89(1), and 90. The wording of
the Protocol has thus not been taken literally as a basis for further distinctions, nor
has it been regarded as containing a chronological order of the procedures to be fol-
lowed. See text accompanying notes 28-35 supra. See also Bossuyt, supra note 27, at
140.
The Protocol might be understood as distinguishing between the legal effect of
"inadmissibility" and "non-consideration" in one respect: Article 4 is placed between
Article 3 (grounds of inadmissibility) and Article 5 (non-consideration). This could
mean that the procedure in Article 4-submission to the state for observations-must
be applied before the Committee ascertains whether the situations mentioned in Arti-
cle 5(2) exist, whereas the Committee will take no such action when it has found that
the conditions in Article 3 are not met. However, this interpretation has not been
adopted by the Committee.
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ferent grounds of inadmissibility are considered. 1 s Moreover,
it has developed extensive case-law on the interpretation and
application of the various conditions of admissibility, with
elaborately reasoned decisions, of which many are pub-
lished.119 Keeping in mind these general observations, we will
turn to the specific grounds of inadmissibility.
There is no material available so far to show whether an
order of precedence among the grounds for inadmissiblity is
developing in the practice of the Committee. As long as the
Committee's decisions remain unpublished, one cannot say
whether it will take an approach similar to the European
Commission or merely select and refer to the simplest
grounds, limiting the legal reasoning in support of its decision
to that which may seem strictly necessary.1 0 Its global, and
thus much more heterogeneous, composition and lack of staff
are factors suggesting a less perfectionist and legalistic ap-
proach to issues of admissibility. The first statistics available
also indicate a drastically higher proportion of cases declared
admissible. 21
Anonymous communication
According to the Protocol, 2 it is a condition of admissi-
bility that the communication is not anonymous. So far, no
communication has been considered anonymous. This rule
will probably be rarely applied, since the normal condition for
registering such a communication will not even be present." 8
Borderline cases may arise. If the communication is not
signed by the author, but it nevertheless is possible to identify
him by the information contained in it, the communication
will probably not be considered anonymous. 24 The right ap-
118. CASTBERG, supra note 101, at 65-66.
119. The European Commission has issued the bilingual series Collection of De-
cisions, vols. 1-46 (1960-1974), Decisions and Reports (1975-present). Many decisions
are also reported in the series now called the Yearbook on the European Convention
on Human Rights.
120. See text accompanying notes 197-219 infra.
121. See text accompanying notes 254-58 infra.
122. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 3; Report I, supra note 4, rule 90(1)(a).
123. At least this is the situation in the European Convention under Article
27(1)(a). European Convention, supra note 33, at 238. It is now an established prac-
tice of the European Commission not to register, as a formal application under
Article 25, anonymous complaints. See CASTBERG, supra note 101, at 58.
124. Bossuyt, supra note 27, at 137. Practical difficulties arise, especially if
19811
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
proach should be for the Secretariat to request clarification
from the author."2 5 If no further information is given, the
communication should be transmitted to the Committee; but
it is likely that the Committee, after having requested infor-
mation without receiving any response, would discontinue its
consideration of the communication without making a deci-
sion as to its admissibility."16
Abuse
The Protocol 2 7 and the Rules 28 provide that a communi-
cation is inadmissible if it is considered an abuse of the right
to submit a communication under the Protocol. So far, this
ground of inadmissibility has not been applied by the
Committee.
The European Commission has been hesitant to declare
an application an abuse of the right to petition," 9 having rec-
ognized as a general principle that rules restricting its compe-
tence should be interpreted restrictively. 30 This should also
be a point of departure for the Committee. The sole fact that
an author is inspired by motives of publicity and political
propaganda should not, therefore, cause the author's commu-
nication to be labelled an abuse. The clause should only be
applied in cases involving communications that use false evi-
dence in order to mislead the Committee or communications
that are totally unsupported by the Covenant and flagrantly
unreasonable. Whether one should admit a communication
when it contains improper language is doubtful.''
This "abuse" clause in the Protocol may, however, be in-
voked to cover also other types of situations for which the
there is no return address for requesting clarification, or if the author asks that his
identity or sources of information should not be revealed to the Government.
125. Report I, supra note 4, rule 80(1)(a).
126. See text accompanying note 212 infra.
127. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 3.
128. Report I, supra note 4, rule 90(1)(c).
129. European Convention, supra note 33, at 238, art. 27(2).
130. See J.E.S. FAWCETT, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 314 (1969); F.G. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 246, 255 (1975).
131. See Schwelb, The Abuse of the Right of Petition, 3 REVUE DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME 313, 327-28 (1970). He criticizes a decision of the Commission, on Article 3
of the Protocol. He also expresses the hope that the Committee will not attach per-
suasive authority to this case when applying the Protocol.
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Protocol does not have any separate provision. In particular,
the Protocol has nothing similar to the European Convention
which finds a petition inadmissible if it is "substantially the
same as a matter that has already been examined by the Com-
mission"' 32 or is "manifestly ill-founded."13 3 It may be argued
that the Committee should use the "abuse" clause in order to
cover such situations instead of developing grounds of inad-
missibility not mentioned in the Protocol. The rule of abuse
in the European Convention is applicable when the applicant
repeatedly submits the same application. Yet the mere fact
that the same matter is re-submitted to the Commission for
consideration is presumably not sufficient to hold it abu-
sive."' An interesting difference as regards the scope of the
abuse clauses in the two instruments may thus develop. The
practical need to dismiss manifestly ill-founded cases may cre-
ate a temptation to lay down a broader notion of abuse.
Incompatibility
The Protocol' " and the Rules'3 6 condition admissibility
on the communication not being "incompatible with the pro-
visions of the Covenant," or rather, with the obligations of the
State Party under the Covenant. These obligations are not
only limited by the substantive provisions of the Covenant,
but also in other respects, e.g., as regards place and time. A
similar rule in the European Convention " 7 has been discussed
regarding the exact meaning of the term "incompatible," and
the relations between the notions "competence" and "compat-
ibility." It is sufficient in this context to state that the Com-
mittee is not competent to consider the merits of the case if
the communication is incompatible.
In the European context, a distinction is usually drawn
between incompatibility ratione temporis, ratione loci, ra-
tione materiae and ratione personae. These expressions have
not been adopted by the Committee. We will nevertheless use
them here for systematical purposes.
132. European Convention, supra note 33, at 238, art. 27(1)(b).
133. Id. art. 27(2).
134. Id. art. 27(1)(b). This Article, which is normally applicable to this situa-
tion, makes it possible to take into account "relevant new information." Id.
135. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 3.
136. Report I, supra note 4, rule 90(1)(d).
137. European Convention, supra note 33, at 238, art. 27(2).
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Ratione temporis. Several communications have been
considered incompatible by the Committee because the events
complained of took place prior to the entry into force of the
Covenant and the Protocol for the State concerned. The Com-
mittee is only competent to consider an alleged violation
which occurred on or after that date. This is in conformity
with general principles of international law. A reference to
such events may, however, be taken into consideration if the
author claims that the violations have continued or have had
effects on or after the decisive date. Events which took place
prior to the entry into force may indeed be an essential ele-
ment of the complaint resulting from alleged violations occur-
ing after the date.188
As might be expected, this ground of inadmissibility has
been frequently applied during the first years of the life of the
Protocol. In several cases the Committee has decided to in-
form the State Party and the author of this legal situation
before making an admissibility decision.13 9 This approach has
been considered appropriate, especially when the events com-
plained of cover a time span both prior to and after the
critical date.
The first case in which the Committee adopted its final
views may serve as an illustration."40 The author, a Uruguayan
national, submitted a communication on behalf of herself, her
husband, her stepfather, and her mother. With regard to her-
self, she alleged that she was detained in Uruguay from April
25 to May 3, 1975, subjected to psychological torture, and not
brought before a judge. This part of the communication was
declared inadmissible, as the Covenant and the Protocol en-
tered into force for Uruguay March 23, 1976, and the viola-
tions had not continued or had effects after that date. On the
other hand, the communication was considered admissible for
the other victims. It was true that they, too, had been arrested
before the entry into force of the Covenant, but their deten-
tion without trial continued after that date.
Ratione materiae. If the author alleges a violation of a
right which is not mentioned in the Covenant, the communi-
cation will be declared inadmissible as incompatible with the
138. Report II, supra note 4, at 99, para. 581.
139. Report I, supra note 4, at 37, para. 153.
140. Report III, supra note 4, at 124-29.
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Covenant provisions. This will be the case, for example, if he
claims that the domestic courts have infringed on his right to
property or that he has been denied asylum, as these rights
are not protected by the Covenant."' In this respect, the
Committee may have to settle the scope of these rights, and
must therefore lay down interpretations which are of interest
beyond the case in question.143 Even if the communication re-
lates to a matter addressed by the Covenant, it must be de-
clared incompatible if the State concerned has made a reser-
vation concerning the matter in issue.
Ratione loci. If the alleged violation has taken place
outside the territory of the respondent State, the communica-
tion will again be considered inadmissible because of incom-
patibility.1 4 3 Within the European system, applications are
not frequently declared incompatible ratione loci. The reason
for this is that the European Convention applies to all indi-
viduals within the jurisdiction of the State Party; 1 4 there-
fore, the territorial aspect is usually not decisive. Because the
Covenant explicitly mentions the "territory" of the State
Party, the ratione loci ground of inadmissibility may be ap-
plied more often than under the European Convention.
It is true that the Protocol protects an individual subject
to the jurisdiction of the State concerned, and does not specif-
ically require him to be "within its territory."1 4 5 It has been
argued, however, that the scope of the procedural protection
afforded by the Protocol cannot be wider than the substantive
protection provided by the Covenant. 4 6 Under such a view
even the Protocol must be interpreted with the territorial lim-
itation of the Covenant.141 This result is not always convinc-
141. The substantive rights of individuals are set out in parts II and III of the
Covenant. Covenant, supra note 1, at 53-56.
142. Others have indicated skepticism as to whether Article 1 of the Covenant
("All peoples have the right of self-determination") may be invoked under the Proto-
col. Covenant, supra note 1 at 53, art. 1. If the Committee should have to face that
problem, a prerequisite must at any rate be that the requirements of Article I of the
Protocol are met.
143. The important provision in this connection is Article 2 of the Covenant,
under which each State Party undertakes to respect and ensure the rights recognized
in the Covenant to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.
Covenant, supra note 1 at 53, art. 2.
144. European Convention, supra note 33, at 224, art. 1.
145. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 1.
146. See Schwelb, International Measures, supra note 12, at 181.
147. Compare Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 1, with Covenant, supra note 1,
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ing. As an illustration, if a citizen's publications are seized or
his passport annulled while he is abroad, he ought to be able
to submit a communication invoking his freedom of expres-
sion or movement under the Covenant; and the travaux
pr~paratoires to the Covenant suggest that the drafters in
adopting the clause "within its territory" did not have such
cases in mind. 8
Ratione personae. Under the practice of the European
Commission, an application may be declared incompatible
with the provisions of the Convention ratione personae. This
term covers two different problems: against whom and by
whom may a complaint be lodged? Similar questions arise
under the Protocol, although they are usually not explicitly
considered in terms of its clause on "compatibility," but
rather under its other provisions.
In answering the first question, against whom a communi-
cation may be brought, the point of departure is rather sim-
ple. The communication must contend a violation of the Cov-
enant by a State Party to the Protocol.14 9 Complaints
concerning states which have not adhered to the Protocol are
not even transmitted by the Secretariat to the Committee.150
The Secretariat has been instructed to draw this to the atten-
tion of the author when it acknowledges the receipt of such
communications.151
A more difficult aspect is the precise extent of the respon-
sibility of the State Party for acts committed under its juris-
diction. Can it contest the admissibility of a communication
on the ground that the alleged violation, if any, was commit-
ted by someone who did not act on its behalf? The Covenant
provides that the State Party undertakes to respect and en-
sure the rights recognized in the Covenant.15' This implies a
double obligation for the State Party to implement the Cove-
nant: first, it must refrain from infringements; second, some
sort of positive action is required to make the rights effec-
at 53, art. 2.
148. See Report IV, supra note 4, at 120, concerning a case which the Commit-
tee considered regarding renewal of a passport to a citizen staying abroad.
149. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 1; Report I, supra note 4, rule 90(1)(a),
(b).
150. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
151. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 1; Report II, supra note 4, at 101, para.
590.
152. Covenant, supra note 1, at 53, art. 2(1).
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tive.1" The exact contents of this latter requirement are open
to doubt, but the State will, to some extent, be responsible
when rights are violated by individuals.'"
The second question, by whom a communication may be
submitted, is rather difficult to answer. Individuals claiming
to be victims of a State's violation may submit a communica-
tion. 5" Thus, the system set up under the Protocol does not
grant an actio popularis; the alleged violation must affect the
person concerned. The point of departure, in the terms of the
Protocol, is that he must be the victim of the alleged
violation.
The notion of victim requires that the individual is per-
sonally affected. As in other systems,'" the problem arises as
to how closely and concretely this must be taken. The victim
of torture is the one who has been tortured, but what about
the person who speaks for justified fear of otherwise being tor-
tured? Similarly, are only those individuals who are punished
for having exercised their freedom of expression affected by,
and victims of, censorship? Or are those remaining silent for
fear of such punishment also victims? More generally, can an
individual complain about the existence of a law or a practice
claimed to be contrary to the Covenant, unless that law or
practice has actually been applied to him? The problem seems
to require a detailed analysis, particularly in light of the Euro-
pean practice,15 7 and we cannot enter into it here.
In the view of the Committee, however, the term victim
does not mean that in every case the individual affected must
sign the communication himself. He may also act through a
153. About this double obligation of implementation, see Opsahl, Human
Rights Today: International Obligations and National Implementation, 23 SCANDI-
NAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 149 (1979).
154. For example, some States are said to use quasi-official liquidation groups,
acting with the tacit consent of the authorities and having as their aim the oppression
of political opponents. The discussion concerning the third-party effect of the Euro-
pean Convention has been rather subtle and this question is still controversial.
155. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 1.
156. Particularly the European one, where the victim in a similar way may sub-
mit a petition under the optional Article 25 of the Convention. See European Con-
vention, supra note 33, at 236, 238, art. 25.
157. On the one hand it is established that the Strasbourg organs cannot rule in
abstracto on the compatibility with the Convention of certain legal rules. On the
other hand, Article 25 entitles individuals to contend that a law violates their rights
by itself, in the absence of an individual measure of implementation, if they run the
risk of being directly affected by it. See, e.g., "Marckx" case, European Court of
Human Rights, ser. A, No. 13 (1979).
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duly-appointed representative. The Committee has therefore
introduced, in its Rules and its practice, the concept of the
actual author of the communication in addition to the alleged
victim. Also there may be other cases in which the author of
the communication may be accepted as having the authority
to act on behalf of the alleged victim. 58 Normally, the com-
munication should be submitted by the individual himself or
by his representative, but the Committee may accept for con-
sideration a communication submitted on behalf of an alleged
victim when it appears that he is unable to submit the com-
munication himself.159
The problem remains as to when a person may act on be-
half of an alleged victim.1 0 In practice, the Committee has
asked whether there is a sufficient link between the author
and the victim. A close family connection has been considered
sufficient. This was the position in the Uruguayan case, where
the author submitted the communication on behalf of her
husband, her stepfather, and her mother.161 One may also
think of other unrelated authors, for example, a friend who
was a fellow inmate, and has escaped from the detention in
which the victim is held incommunicado. The burden of proof
for a sufficient link rests on the author. The Committee has
declined to consider communications where the authors have
failed to establish any link between themselves and the vic-
tim. Reliable knowledge about his position and inability to act
for himself are not enough.
The term victim in the European Convention has been
developed through considerable case law, under which only
persons claiming to be victims themselves have standing.
These victims may, of course, be represented by others, nor-
mally lawyers, guardians, or close relatives. In addition to the
representative, the notion of an "indirect victim" has emerged
in practice. Yet it is still a prerequisite for this indirect stand-
158. Report II, supra note 4, at 99, para. 580.
159. Report I, supra note 4, rule 90(1)(b).
160. During the drafting of Rule 90, some members argued that a person sub-
mitting a communication on behalf of an alleged victim had to be "authorized" to do
so. This proposal was rejected on two grounds. First, it was too restrictive, eliminat-
ing the possibility of submitting a communication on behalf of an alleged victim who
was unable, for reasons beyond his control, to submit it himself or to authorize an-
other person to act on his behalf. Second, the word could be construed as referring to
criteria of domestic law. See Report I, supra note 4, at 12, para. 66.
161. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
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ing that the matters complained of must have affected the
rights of the petitioning person at least indirectly under the
Convention."'s One may think of the husband complaining
that his wife was granted an abortion, and invoking Article 2
of the Convention as regards the right to life of the unborn
child he fathered.
From the outset, the attitude adopted by the Committee
has been more pragmatic. In comparison to the European
Convention, persons may complain of violations, even if their
rights have not been infringed upon, provided that a sufficient
link to the victim is established. This is one of the reasons
why the neutral term author has been introduced, covering
not only the victim, but a representative and a person with
whom there exists a sufficient link. On the other hand, under
the European Convention, "any person, non-governmental or-
ganization or group of individuals" 1 8 may lodge an applica-
tion claiming to be the victim,'" while the Protocol only
speaks of individuals.1" This term must include not only one
individual per communication, but also several individuals
acting together in one communication, as long as each of them
is claiming to be a victim.1 6" For instance, if a group of women
allege sex discrimination regarding the right to marry, it may
not be necessary to examine the extent to which each of them
is actually, and not only potentially, a victim. If she is a po-
tential victim, the question may be whether the discrimina-
tion affects her personally to a degree which justifies her par-
ticipation in the communication.
It is more doubtful whether a non-governmental organiza-
tion may submit a communication. That it should not be able
to do so, even if it is claiming to be a "victim" in its own right,
seems to follow from the wording of the Protocol.1 67 It would
162. See Jacobs, supra note 130, at 229.
163. European Convention, supra note 33, at 236, art. 25(1).
164. Id. at 236, 238, art. 25.
165. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, Preamble, arts. 1, 3.
166. See Schwelb, International Measures, supra note 12, at 182. But see BoB-
suyt, supra note 27, at 144. Bossuyt points out that the European Convention ex-
cludes organizations and groups but admits communications common to several per-
sons; Bossuyt states that in the latter case the Committee must examine the
admissibility for each of them taken individually. We think this is correct in princi-
ple, but it is too early to say how literally the Committee will apply this if it is clear
that a number of those identified individuals who are submitting the common com-
munication have the required standing.
167. As mentioned in the text accompanying notes 12-27 supra, many proposals
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be unreasonable, however, always to deny these organizations
standing under the Protocol, as they must clearly be protected
by many of the substantive provisions of the Covenant. The
Protocol should not be interpreted literally and narrowly in
these matters, in view of the haste in which it was drawn up
and the lack of any apparent discussion of the implications.
The main difficulty may be organizations as representa-
tives, rather than as victims. Such a role may have appeared
particularly unwelcome, at least to some governments, and
may be seen as excluded by the text of the Covenant. There is
reason to believe that the Committee, referring to the terms of
Article 1 of the Protocol, will not allow the organizations to
act as authors representing others. Thus, it will oblige the or-
ganizations wishing to take part in the development of the
system to "hide" behind the name of a person duly authorized
to act in each case.1"
Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
The Protocol provides that the Committee shall not con-
sider any communication from an individual unless it has
ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been ex-
hausted.6 9 This condition is essential for the orderly opera-
tion of the Protocol and its acceptance by States Parties. It
adopts, of course, a fundamental principle of general interna-
tional law, where the observance of the domestic remedies
rule is the normal condition for the exercise of any interna-
tional remedy.170 The rationale is based on the right and duty
of the State to correct any wrong which may be shown before
its internal fora, particularly courts and tribunals, thus re-
were submitted during the deliberations in the Commission on Human Rights to rec-
ognize the right of petition to individuals, groups, or non-governmental organizations.
Yet the proposals in the Third Committee only mentioned individuals and groups of
individuals. The omission was hardly due to an oversight. The activity of non-govern-
mental organizations in the human rights field is so prominent that their omission
must be explained by at least deliberate caution, if not a wish directly to exclude
them.
168. If the Committee so prefers, it may perhaps also exclude the organizations
by relying on Article 4 of the Protocol, particularly the French text, which assumes
that a communication must be presented "en vertu du prksent Protocole." See Pro-
tocol, supra note 1 at 59, art. 4; Bossuyt, supra note 27, at 141.
169. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, arts. 2, 5(2)(b). See also Report I, supra note
4, rule 90(1)(f).
170. This principle has been developed, for example, in the practice of claims
commissions, arbitral tribunals, and the International Court of Justice.
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moving the cause of complaint. As long as the State has not
had the chance to do so, the international organ is simply not
competent. The primacy of domestic remedies and the subsid-
iary character of the international control machinery are thus
two sides of the same coin.
It is already clear that this condition may come to play a
very important role in the practice of the Committee, as it
does in similar bodies. In traditional inter-State relations,
where only the States have locus standi before the interna-
tional organs, the domestic remedies requirement has not
been so frequently applied as in systems allowing for interna-
tional petitions by individuals themselves. As a result, the
quickly developing case law within such systems will soon be-
come the main source of precedents.1 7 1
It is against this common background that each system
may develop its particularities and practices. In this respect,
it is perhaps not very important that the texts of the relevant
instruments differ slightly. For example, the Protocol ex-
pressly refers to "available" remedies; the European Conven-
tion to "generally recognised rules of international law." The
intention is broadly the same. Therefore, the principle devel-
oped by the European Commission that only effective and
sufficient remedies are relevant will no doubt also be applied
by the Committee. The type of remedy is, on the other hand,
irrelevant, especially whether it is a judicial or an administra-
tive one. Probably, the Committee will, like the European
Commission, only consider ordinary remedies available in the
domestic procedures, such as judicial appeals to the highest
tribunals or administrative complaints to the top of the gov-
ernment hierarchy, but not extraordinary remedies, such as
requests for a retrial or for pardon by the Head of State or
complaints to an Ombudsman only entitled to state advisory
opinions.
In European case law, ignorance of the remedy, high
costs, contrary advice from counsel, and the lack of any pros-
pect of success do not absolve the individual of the exhaustion
171. The Committee has considered that this condition of admissibility should
be interpreted and applied in accordance with the generally accepted principles con-
cerning the matter in the field of human rights. This implies that the practice of
similar bodies, particularly under Article 26 of the European Convention, will be of
considerable interest. See European Convention, supra note 33, at 238, art. 26; See
also O'Boyle, supra note 47, at 712-15.
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requirement. On the other hand, the term "available" in the
Protocol may be used to soften some of the harsher effects of
the strict application of non-exhaustion as a ground for inad-
missibility. If remedies are only available in law and not in
actuality, they may be disregarded or considered ineffective.
Examples include the ignorance of the alleged victim being
detained incommunicado, or costs of litigation making the ex-
ercise of the remedy impossible or theoretical.
In view of the variety of legal systems coming under this
rule, the Protocol will most certainly not be seen as referring
only to domestic remedies that directly apply the Covenant
provisions. In fact, few States Parties seem to have authorized
domestic organs to do so, and one cannot draw the conclusion
that any other remedy is ineffective for this reason alone. The
rule should be that the remedy must be one whereby corre-
sponding principles of domestic law are applicable, such as to
offer in substance the same protection. If no such remedy,
principle, or law exists, there is nothing to exhaust. Such a
situation would in itself mean that the State was in breach of
Article 2 of the Covenant.172
If the State Party concerned disputes the contention of
the communication that all available domestic remedies have
been exhausted, the Committee has required the State Party
to give details of the effective remedies available to the al-
leged victim in the particular circumstances of the case. A
general description of the rights available to accused persons
under law and the domestic remedies designed to protect and
safeguard these rights have been deemed insufficient. 78 One
should also note that according to the express wording of the
Protocol, the domestic remedies clause does not prevent the
Committee from taking a case under consideration if the ap-
plication of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged.17 4 In this
situation one might say that exactly because of such delay,
domestic remedies are not effective.176
172. Article 2 requires that the Covenant shall be implemented in domestic law
and an effective remedy granted. Covenant, supra note 1, at 53, art. 2(2), (3)(a).
173. Report II, supra note 4, at 101, para. 586. See Report III, supra note 4, at
124-29; Report IV, supra note 4, at 91, para. 397; See, e.g., id. at 108-09.
174. See text accompanying notes 187-89 infra.
175. The European Convention states that an application may only be brought
before the Commission within a period of six months from the date on which the final
decision in the case was taken. European Convention, supra note 33, at 238, art. 26.
The Protocol contains no such rule. See text accompanying notes 192-93 infra.
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Non-exhaustion is only a temporary obstacle to admissi-
bility when remedies are being, or still may be, pursued. Yet if
it is too late to exercise the remedy under domestic law, for
example when the time-limit for an appeal has expired, this
obstacle becomes a definitive one.
International Remedies
Further, the Committee shall not consider a communica-
tion if the same matter is being examined under another pro-
cedure of international investigation or settlement.1 7 Several
authors have discussed this principle when considering the co-
existence of different procedures. 1" It is obviously intended to
prevent simultaneous, duplicating procedures. The purpose of
this "international remedies" rule is therefore quite different
from that of the "domestic remedies" rule. In comparison, the
former is applicable only when the international remedy is
used and not when it is omitted; its effect then becomes the
opposite of failing to pursue domestic remedies. The use of
another international remedy is an obstacle to, not a precon-
dition for, the competence of the Committee. 78
This obstacle is, at the outset, a temporary one. Accord-
ingly, the Committee has decided that it is not precluded
from considering a communication if the matter has been
withdrawn from, or is no longer being examined under, an-
other procedure at the time the Committee reaches a decision
as to admissibility.17 In order to apply the rule, and possibly
to find that it is no longer applicable, the Committee needs to
know about the development of other international applica-
tions. To ascertain these points ex officio poses a practical
problem. It is not enough to rely on the author, or, for that
matter, the State Party; moreover, neither is necessarily fully
informed. It may happen that the same matter is submitted
by another person (e.g., a relative), or that the situation has
176. See Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 5(2)(a); Report I, supra note 4, rule
90(1)(e).
177. See, e.g., Mikaelsen, 91 TIDSSKRIFT FOR RErrsvrrENSKAP 692 (1978).
178. The rule does not limit the right of the individual to choose between the
different petition systems. But when he has opted for one procedure, Article 5(2)(a)
prevents him from mobilizing other procedures of international investigation or set-
tlement, i.e., the principle of adjournment pendente lite. Protocol, supra note 1 at 59,
art. 5(2)(a).
179. Report II, supra note 4, at 100, para. 583.
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not been brought to the attention of the State Party.
Information directly from other international petitioning
systems may be necessary to avoid the Committee's examina-
tion of a matter already under consideration. The Committee
has accordingly requested the Secretariat to engage in such
exchange of information as may be necessary to enable the
Committee to ascertain whether this examination obstacle ex-
ists. In practice, the Inter-American and European organs
have already been engaged to that effect.180
During its deliberations, the Committee has discovered a
difference between the Chinese, English, French, and Russian
text, on the one hand, and the Spanish version, on the other.
The meaning of the Spanish text is that the Committee shall
not consider a communication unless it has ascertained that
the same matter "has not been" examined, whereas the other
languages focus the decision on whether the same matter "is
being" examined. As this discrepancy stems from an editorial
oversight in the preparation of the final version of the Spanish
text, the Committee has decided to base its practice under
Article 5(2) on the Chinese, English, French, and Russian lan-
guage versions.181
This interpretation implies that the provision does not
set forth the principle of non bis in idem. When the examina-
tion of a complaint under another procedure of international
investigation or settlement is terminated, the Committee is at
liberty to consider the same matter. The situation is different
under the European system. It has been argued that one
should avoid the possibility of an individual "appeal" from
the European organs to the Human Rights Committee, and
some countries have tabled reservations to this effect.182
The Committee is only prevented from considering the
matter if it is being examined under another procedure of in-
180. Id. para. 585.
181. Id. para. 584.
182. Article 5(2)(a) only contains a restricted limitation of the Committee's
competence. This aspect becomes even more apparent when taking into account that
the principle of adjournment pendente lite may be considered as a "relative" princi-
ple in this context. See text accompanying notes 187-89 infra.
The Committee of Ministers in the Council of Europe, by a resolution in May,
1970, recommended that member States when ratifying the Protocol should make
such reservations, which Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have done. See, e.g., Mikael-
sen, supra note 177, at 705. Their example has later been followed by Iceland, Italy,
and the Netherlands.
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ternational investigation or settlement. The Committee has
interpreted this to relate solely to procedures implemented by
inter-State or intergovernmental organizations on the basis of
inter-State or intergovernmental agreements or arrangements.
Procedures established by non-governmental organizations
(e.g., the procedure of the Inter-Parliamentary Council of the
Inter-Parliamentary Union) cannot bar the Committee from
considering communications submitted to it under the
Protocol.183
Finally, the expression "the same matter" raises ques-
tions of interpretation, some of them difficult. The phrase
clearly refers to an individual complaint submitted under an-
other international procedure. The Committee has deter-
mined that the procedure set up under ECOSOC resolution
15038 ' does not fall within the scope of Article 5(2)(a). The
question at issue under that system is whether there exists a
situation which reveals a consistent pattern of gross human
rights violations. Such a situation cannot be considered "the
same matter" as an individual complaint.185 The 1503 proce-
dure affects large numbers, perhaps the whole population of a
given country. To examine such a situation is a task very dif-
ferent from that raised by communications from alleged vic-
tims. Thus the Committee could not consider itself prevented
by that procedure. Otherwise, the alleged victims would be
denied the individual remedy which is the object of the Proto-
col. On the other hand, even though the other complaint is
based on another instrument, (e.g., European or American
Conventions), this clearly does not make it a different matter.
Otherwise, the clause would have no meaning, because only
the Committee and its procedure exist internationally to ap-
ply the Covenant to individual complaints. Yet the problem of
the identity of the "matter" arises if the applicable provisions
are not legally similar. If new or different factual aspects are
invoked, this may again be a different matter, although the
same alleged victim and events are involved.
The question of "same matter" may become even more
complex when reservations exclude the competence of the
183. Report II, supra note 4, at 99-100, para. 582.
184. 48 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1A) 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.1 (1970). See
Tardu, The United Nations Response to Gross Violations of Human Rights: The
1503 Procedure, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 559 (1980).
185. Report II, supra note 4, at 99-100, para. 582.
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Committee once the issue has been examined under another
procedure. For instance, does the reservation apply even if the
matter was then declared inadmissible, so that its merits were
not considered? A full discussion of this question would have
to consider, in particular, the various grounds of inadmissibil-
ity. They do not all seem to lead to the same answer. Since
our space is limited and the practice of the Committee has not
yet developed, these indications will have to suffice here.'"
Exception: Unreasonable Prolongation
Even if the domestic remedies are not exhausted, it is
clear that the Committee is not totally precluded from consid-
ering the communication: "This shall not be the rule where
the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged."" 7
Such delay could already have occurred when the communica-
tion is submitted. It is then immediately admissible on this
point. If the delay only appears after a decision of inadmissi-
bility for non-exhaustion, this new fact alone should then lead
to a review of that decision.
During the drafting of the Rules of Procedure the ques-
tion arose whether the Committee may consider the commu-
nication when the application of other international remedies
is unreasonably prolonged. The question may also be formu-
lated in this way: Does the sentence introduced by the word
"this" in the English text refer not only back to subparagraph
(b), domestic remedies, but even to subparagraph (a), other
international procedures? 88
Various arguments were advanced and the U.N. Legal
Counsel was consulted about these two possible interpreta-
tions. The intention of the authors of the Protocol, as ex-
pressed in the travaux pr~paratoires, was one of the argu-
186. See Mikaelsen, supra note 177, at 706 for an interpretation of these
reservations.
187. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 5(2).
188. A typesetting discrepancy between the original versions in the various offi-
cial languages complicates the question. In the original English text, the sentence
appears in the same sub-paragraph as the text of the domestic remedies clause, i.e. as
part of (b). This is an argument in favor of the view that the prolongation clause only
applies in regard to domestic remedies. In the French and Spanish texts, however, the
sentence is placed on a new line, forming a separate sub-paragraph which seems to
imply that the Committee may consider a communication also when the unreasonable
prolongation occurs at the international level. See Bossuyt, supra note 27, at 145-47;
Report I, supra note 4, at 12-13, paras. 68-73.
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ments advanced in favor of the latter interpretation.
Conversely, the wish to avoid competition with other interna-
tional bodies and not to pass judgments on their procedures
supported the former, more restricted, understanding. The
Committee finally decided to bypass the problem by formulat-
ing a provision as follows: "The Committee shall consider a
communication, which is otherwise admissible, whenever the
circumstances referred to in article 5(2) of the Protocol ap-
ply."''1 9 This Rule, unfortunately, forgets to refer explicitly to
the last sentence of Article 5(2). It therefore may look rather
mysterious or even contradictory to the uninitiated. Yet the
intention was clearly to leave the scope of the prolongation
clause still open to discussion.
Other Conditions of Admissibility?
All the conditions of admissibility explicitly set forth in
the Protocol have now been commented upon. But is this list
exhaustive? The general problem considered above should be
kept in mind: Where does one draw the line between supple-
menting the Protocol and departing from it? Since the Com-
mittee agreed from the beginning that the Protocol only es-
tablishes the conditions, not the procedure, of admissibility," 0
one cannot exclude a grey area where Rules and practice may
add or develop what may be called "procedural conditions"
based upon practical needs and common sense. Some illustra-
tions will have to suffice.
We have noted that the Protocol contains no provision
laying down as a ground of inadmissibility that the same mat-
ter already has been examined by the Committee. So far, no
such rule has developed in practice, and it may be argued that
the Committee should prefer to use the abuse clause.19'
Further, there is no time-limit in the Protocol for the ad-
mission of communications, such as in the European Conven-
tion." 2 This matter was brought up when the Committee con-
sidered its Rules of Procedure. The Secretariat draft on which
189. Report I, supra note 4, at 64, rule 90(2).
190. Report I, supra note 4, at 11, para. 59 states: "This task was expressly left
for the Committee."
191. See text accompanying note 132 supra. Taking into account previous com-
ments on the abuse clause, it is likely that this provision may be used rather fre-
quently as compared with the similar rule in the European Convention.
192. See European Convention, supra note 33, at 238, art. 26.
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(
the Committee based its discussions contained a rule provid-
ing that the Committee should normally not give considera-
tion to claims received more than twenty-four months after
the exhaustion of all domestic remedies. This gave rise to a
debate as to whether this Rule was in conformity with the
spirit and the letter of the Protocol.1" Some members argued
that this provision was a matter of substance and that it
would be contrary to the Protocol to introduce such a rule. It
was also pointed out that the Rules of Procedure were not
likely to be known to the public in the various countries.
Other members contended that the establishment of a time-
limit for the admission of complaints was a generally accepted
principle or practice of domestic and international law. They
argued further that it was important to protect the Commit-
tee from difficult situations brought on by examining com-
munications based on events in a distant past.
The Committee preferred to postpone a final decision.
The draft rule was deleted, with the understanding that the
Committee might revert to the matter if experience justified
the consideration of such a provision. It was therefore unnec-
essary to decide whether the Committee may adopt a time-
limit, and it will now be possible to gain experience as to
whether such a rule should be introduced. There is no urgency
about this matter during the first few years of the system,
where the limitation of the Committee's competence ratione
temporis takes care of any older complaints. This situation
will change over time, however, the Protocol having been in
force since 1976 for a number of States. The clause against
abuse could also be used to prevent unreasonably late
communications.
The European Commission shall not deal with a petition
which is "manifestly ill-founded. '19 4 This ground of inadmissi-
bility, which literally means prejudging the merits or joining
the two stages, has been used in numerous hopeless European
cases and sometimes in difficult matters, even after thorough
proceedings. The Protocol has adopted no such provision.
Once more, in extremis cases may be declared inadmissible as
an abuse of the right to submit communications.19 5 If not,
193. See Bossuyt, supra note 27, at 147-48.
194. European Convention, supra note 33, at 238, art. 27(2).
195. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 3.
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does this mean that the Committee will have to consider the
merits of the case and then conclude that there has been no
violation of the Covenant? Such a duty may entail a consider-
able work-load for the Committee and its Secretariat, not to
mention delays involved in the extra procedural steps re-
quired once the matter enters the stage of the merits.
There is reason to believe that the Committee may seek
to avoid this result. Where obviously unfounded or untrue al-
legations are made, without any attempt at substantiation, or
where the rights of the Covenant are invoked on facts which
clearly do not warrant review, the Committee may conclude
that the matter does not merit further consideration or does
not raise any issue under the Covenant. Such conclusions
would, however, not correspond directly to any provision of
the Protocol. In order to forestall the objection that the Com-
mittee cannot lay down further conditions of admissibility
than those mentioned in the Protocol, we are of the opinion
that in such cases the Committee could well consider and de-
scribe a communication as "incompatible with the provisions
of the Covenant" within the meaning of Article 3 of the
Protocol. 96
DECISIONS AT THE STAGE OF ADMISSIBILITY
The procedure and conditions of admissibility' 97 require a
number of decisions. Some of these are only procedural and
are largely left to the Committee's own Rules and practices.
Others are taken in exercise of the Committee's powers to de-
termine substantive issues arising at the admissibility stage.
Although these issues do not relate to the merits of the claim
that human rights have been violated, decisions on admissibil-
ity may involve substantive interpretations of the Covenant.
This is particularly the case regarding one of the conditions of
admissibility, the compatibility of the communication with
the provisions of the Covenant. 98 In further discussing the
kinds of decisions, the power to make them, and their effect,
it may be convenient to distinguish between decisions during
the admissibility stage and decisions ending that stage.
We should first consider the manner in which all these
196. See text accompanying notes 141-42 supra.
197. See text accompanying notes 36-60 & 112-96 supra.
198. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 3.
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decisions are reached. Under the Covenant, all decisions of
the Committee are to be made "by a majority vote of the
members present."199 This provision is mandatory for the
Rules of Procedure. From the outset, however, it was strongly
argued within the Committee, mainly by the members coming
from the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries, that the Com-
mittee ought, in principle, to seek consensus rather than pro-
ceed with formal voting. It was proposed that this consensus
viewpoint be expressed in the Rules. This proposal was op-
posed both on principle and out of fear that it might have
unfortunate consequences. Long and difficult deliberations
followed, partly in informal consultations.2 00 As a compromise
solution, it was agreed to state in the annual report that Com-
mittee members generally had expressed the view that the
"method of work" of the Committee "normally should allow
for attempts to reach decisions by consensus before voting,"
provided, inter alia, that the Covenant was "observed. '"201
The result has been that no formal vote has ever been
taken, not even in order to confirm the consensus (or unanim-
ity) by which decisions normally are made within the Com-
mittee and stated by the Chairman. In other words, the prac-
tice of the Committee immediately became that of reaching
decisions by consensus instead of voting, and not only before
voting as agreed in the compromise. This difference is perhaps
mainly formal, and the Committee has adopted its practice
with open eyes, so far without much difficulty.
Such has also been the case in the Committee's work on
communications under the Protocol. Moreover, it may be seen
from what the Committee has published that decisions under
the Protocol appear as made by the Committee as an entity.
Neither the decisions nor the summary records indicate which
members were present or took part in the decisions. It is only
in adopting views of the merits that individual opinions by
named members may break the anonymity, which, up to that
point, characterizes the Committee's decisions.
199. Covenant, supra note 1, at 57, art. 39(2)(b).
200. See Bossuyt, supra note 27, at 119-25.
201. Report I, supra note 4, at 8, para. 32. It was further agreed to draw atten-
tion to this point, which in itself was an example of consensus at work, in a footnote
to rule 51. Id. rule 51 note (a).
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Decisions During the Procedure
During the admissibility procedure, decisions are made
under the relevant Rules, for instance, about whether to re-
quest clarifications or further information from the author, or
whether to transmit the communication to the State Party for
reply. Illustrations of such decisions are summarized in the
annual reports. 2  Some of them, such as those involving gen-
eral points of interpretation or the length of time-limits for
submission of information, observations, or comments, have
been made generally applicable, without having been made
part of the Rules.
Obviously, it is an administrative task to prepare the
cases for the Committee. Yet directing the procedure is a dif-
ferent matter which requires a policy. For example, whether
transmission to a State Party is required may involve delicate
assessments, and there has been no willingness to delegate
such decisions to the Secretariat. So far, the result has been
that such decisions can only be made when the Committee is
in session. It is true that the Rules authorize a Working
Group to decide whether to make the necessary requests to
the parties and fix time-limits on the Committee's behalf 203
This simplifies the procedure"' but has not yet significantly
expedited the process. So far, no Working Group has met be-
tween the sessions, meeting only immediately before and dur-
ing them due to budgetary constraints.
Although the Secretariat has been given certain functions
under the Rules 0 5 and serves as the channel of communica-
tions with the authors and the States Parties concerned, 206 the
Secretariat is naturally reluctant towards suggestions to in-
crease its decision-making role. On occasion, the Secretariat
has referred to the generally recognized need for distinguish-
ing clearly between its own administrative functions and the
juridical competence of the Committee, particularly regarding
202. Id. at 37-38, paras. 150-54; Report II, supra note 4, at 98; Report III, supra
note 4, at 104; Report IV, supra note 4, at 89.
203. Report I, supra note 4, rule 91.
204. Report II, supra note 4, at 101, para. 588. Such decisions "henceforth"
(after agreement at the fourth session) do not require approval by the Committee.
205. See Report I, supra note 4, rules 78-81.
206. The Secretariat has also been authorized to assist individuals by drawing
up and making use of guidelines and a model form of communications. Report I,
supra note 4, at 102, para. 591.
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the pre-screening of communications.07
During the procedure, two or more communications may
be merged for joint consideration by a separate decision.08
The Rules also provide for decisions, or expressions of the
Committee's view as to the desirability of interim measures.2 0'
Decisions Ending the Procedure
Decisions ending the Committee's consideration of admis-
sibility normally conclude by declaring the communication ei-
ther admissible or inadmissible. Two decisions in the latter
category were already adopted at the earliest opportunity2 10
It follows from this fact that no further procedural steps were
found necessary. Since only summaries and general decisions
on points of admissibility have been published, the reasoning
in these and other case decisions on admissibility is not open
to comment. It appears from the first case of published
"views", however, that communications may also be declared
partly inadmissible, partly admissible.1 1
However, these are not exhaustive alternatives. Other cat-
egories of decisions ending or suspending the consideration of
communications have appeared, though such categories are
foreseen neither in the Protocol nor in the Rules. In the Euro-
pean system, the category of "striking an application off the
list" has developed in a similar fashion. This happens in
particular, but not unforeseeable, situations arising primarily
when the contact with the author has been lost. This may re-
sult from difficulties in communication or lack of interest on
the author's part. In such cases, the Committee may be un-
able to, or may not wish to, decide on the admissibility or in-
admissibility of the communication, but may prefer to discon-
tinue or suspend its consideration. This procedural decision
temporarily ends the Committee's activity without preventing,
as a decision of inadmissibility would, a later consideration.2
207. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 36-40 supra; see also Bossuyt, supra
note 27, at 130.
208. Report III, supra note 4, at 107-08, para. 454 refers to examples concerning
Canada and Uruguay.
209. Report I, supra note 4, rule 86.
210. Report I, supra note 4, at 37, para. 149. See Report III, supra note 4, at
106, para. 448 on the practice when the inadmissibility is clear from the communica-
tion itself.
211. Report III, supra note 4, at 126.
212. See id. at 106-08, paras. 449, 454 where reference is made to a number of
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A particular situation arises if the author of the commu-
nication states that he wishes the communication withdrawn.
This is obviously no reason in itself to declare the communica-
tion inadmissible, but is, in most cases, sufficient to discon-
tinue it. However, a proposal to make provisions for this situ-
ation in the Rules of Procedure was not adopted, as members
did not agree on the precise conditions and suggested that
more experience should be gained."18 Difficulties may be seen
on two points. First, is the withdrawal really voluntary? Sec-
ond, could a communication be of such general interest that
once it is introduced in accordance with the Protocol, consid-
eration ought to continue despite the later position taken by
the author? It may not be in the interest of human rights to
allow the government to "pay him off" in return for his with-
drawal of the communication. On the other hand, an unofficial
settlement on the basis of respect of human rights should not
be obstructed by the Committee.
Finally, it would seem open to the Committee to join a
point concerning admissibility to the merits, without deciding
the matter at this stage. One example would be its reviewing
the effectiveness of domestic remedies. While the effect of this
joinder is that the communication is technically declared ad-
missible so that the stage of the merits is entered, the ques-
tion of admissibility is nevertheless reserved. 1 '
Furthermore, the Committee must be able to make par-
tial decisions on admissibility, dividing this stage so that the
admissibility of one complaint or the presence of one or more
conditions is decided earlier than other issues of admissibility.
This is a well-known practice in similar bodies.21 5 Reasons of
procedural economy may suggest such a solution. Yet this de-
velopment may make the case files appear complicated and
delay the final decision. Therefore, partial decisions should
not become a normal practice.
discontinued communications in respect of various countries, and one suspended
communication.
213. See Bossuyt, supra note 27, at 135.
214. This possibility is closely related to, but technically different from the situ-
ation envisaged in rule 93(4) that the Committee "may review its decision that the
communication is admissible" in the light of what it is told at the stage of the merits.
See text accompanying notes 216-19 infra.
215. Partial and later final decisions on admissibility are often published by the
European Commission of Human Rights in its series referred to above. See note 121
supra.
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Effect of Decisions
The main effect of the procedural decisions, depending on
their contents, is normally to govern the steps leading to de-
cisions on admissibility. If the former decisions are not ob-
served, for instance, or if a party does not meet a time-limit, it
may lead to discontinuing or suspending the proceedings. If
the State Party does not react, or is late, it may result in a
decision declaring the case admissible. The effect of a decision
on admissibility is either to dispose of the communication def-
initely, if inadmissible, or, in the admissible cases, to open the
consideration of the merits of the case. 1
Although it is not expressly stated in the Protocol, deci-
sions on admissibility may be regarded as binding in law on
the parties. They have no right of appeal to any other body or
to claim reconsideration of this decision by the Committee.
The Committee clearly has no duty to grant a request to re-
examine a communication once declared inadmissible, nor has
it any duty to review the admissibility decision at the stage of
the merits.
This is a point of departure, yet it is subject to certain
major qualifications. In the first place, the Committee has
made it clear that it "may," during the stage of the merits,
review its decision of admissibility. 17 This explicit statement
does not entail any duty for it to do so, and may be explained
by the wish to keep open the possibility of reconsideration of
difficult matters, such as whether a remedy that has not been
exhausted and that has not been shown to be an effective one,
nevertheless should have been considered relevant, based
upon information and arguments obtained during the merits.
Secondly, temporary obstacles to admissibility, such as
non-exhaustion or simultaneous examination elsewhere,218
may have been removed. This new fact certainly justifies a
new communication. However, no published practice has yet
clarified whether, in the alternative, the same communication
may be re-introduced or restored to the list and the original
admissibility decision reviewed formally. Since the decision
216. See text accompanying notes 220-41 infra.
217. The Committee amended rule 93 in 1978 by adding this provision as para-
graph 4. Report II, supra note 4, at 120.
218. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 5(2). Rule 92(2) allows a review of deci-
sions of inadmissibility upon request in such cases. Report I, supra note 4, rule 92(2).
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was correct when it was made, the seemingly better course
would be to register and treat the matter as a fresh
communication.
Besides its effect on the parties and the procedure in the
particular case, the decision may also serve as a precedent.
For others to rely on it as such is, however, difficult, unless
decisions are published or reasoning is disclosed in the annual
report so that guidance for future cases is provided. Earlier
decisions will most certainly be raised as precedents within
the Committee in deliberations in later, similar cases, even
though elaborate reasoning is not published. If or when pub-
lished, these decisions may also serve the interests of others,
such as future authors, lawyers, governments, and scholars in-
terested in studying the case law of the Committee. We have
made reference to the rather selective information about deci-
sions on the admissibility stage published so far. More public
reporting of such decisions should be regarded as desirable.21'
MERITS (ARTICLE 4 AND ARTICLE 5(1)) OF THE PROTOCOL
The Protocol provisions governing admissibility need a
great deal of elaboration in order to be interpreted and ap-
plied. We can only hope that our readers will not think we
have overdone that task. Yet these provisions are relatively
abundant compared to what follows. What the Protocol says
specifically about the consideration of the merits is, indeed,
laconic. The key word regarding an admissible communication
is that the Committee shall "consider" it.2 2 0
The Protocol further provides for the self-evident duty of
the Committee to bring the communication to the attention of
the State Party concerned.22 The more crucial duty of the
State Party is to submit to the Committee, within six months,
"written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and
the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that
State." ' Then follows the quite generally expressed duty of
219. See text accompanying notes 251-53 infra.
220. This verb appears both in the Preamble and in Articles 1 and 5(1). Article
2 uses the noun, "consideration." Articles 4 and 5(1) are the main provisions on the
Committee's functions on the merits.
221. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 4(1). Under Rule 91(2) this is done
before it is declared admissible, but rule 93(1) completes the picture: The decision
and (other) relevant documents shall also be submitted to the State Party.
222. Id. art. 4(2).
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the Committee to "consider communications received under
the present Protocol in the light of all written information
made available to the individual and by the State Party con-
cerned." '22s We have already discussed as a question of princi-
ple2 24 how far this latter provision defines and limits the na-
ture and kind of Committee action at this stage.
Consideration by the Committee is not subject to any other
specific description or prescription, except conditions of ad-
missibility 25 and the general obligation to "hold closed meet-
ings when examining communications under the present Pro-
tocol. 2 26 Yet the consideration clearly has to be brought to
some conclusion, called the Committee's "views.
'1 2 7
The main subject matter of the examination on the mer-
its is, of course, whether any provision of the Covenant has
been violated in respect of an alleged victim. Thus, the Cove-
nant is the general frame of reference for the Committee's
consideration. Having declared a communication admissible,
the Committee may have implied that if the allegations are
true, provisions of the Covenant have been violated. Strictly
speaking, no more has been decided than that the Covenant
may be applicable to such allegations; otherwise the communi-
cation should have been declared incompatible and thus inad-
missible. Already such a finding may involve a determination
of legal issues of the interpretation of Covenant provisions.2 "
However, the answer on the merits may not only depend on
whether the facts alleged are true. It may also depend on
whether the interpretation and application of a Covenant pro-
vision argued by the author of the communication will be re-
tained by the Committee. If the proffered interpretation is in
dispute, it is not to be prejudged. In this respect, the admissi-
bility decision will have to define the frame of reference of the
Committee more particularly in each individual case. Ques-
tions of fact as well as questions of law may thus belong to the
stage of the merits.
223. Id. art. 5(1).
224. See text accompanying notes 93-98 supra.
225. See Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 5(2).
226. Id. art. 5(3).
227. The Protocol provides: "The Committee shall forward its views to the
State Party concerned and to the individual." Id. art. 5(4).
228. In addition, the decision may, in that event, deal with issues of interpreta-
tion of reservations made by the State Party concerned.
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We should emphasize that the function of the Committee
under the Protocol could not be seen as a judicial one. The
task of the Committee is not that of a court, neither in subject
matter nor in form. Whatever its views, 29 the Committee ob-
viously cannot make any judgment binding in law on the par-
ties nor hold public hearings.2 30 There are also other differ-
ences from the judicial functions. 23 1 Although international
proceedings necessarily differ from those of domestic courts or
tribunals, those differences are too important to be ignored.
What, then, is the task of the Committee at the stage of
the merits, and how shall it be carried out? These are the
main problems to which the Protocol gives very little gui-
dance. One school of thought, Western or Western-influenced,
might prefer to describe the task as "quasi-judicial. '2-2 The
decisions on admissibility represent a binding application of
the law of the Covenant and Protocol as far as they go. Ren-
dering an opinion on the main subject matter, such as
whether an alleged victim has suffered a violation of any of
his civil and political rights, necessarily involves a determina-
tion which should be carried out under judicial considerations.
Thus, the context and purpose, if not the text, of the Protocol
supports the "quasi-judicial" conception of the Committee's
function.
The fact is, however, that this conception has not been
reflected in any provision of the Protocol and only practice
can develop it. In a Committee which normally proceeds by
consensus, and where a majority of its members (twelve of
eighteen) come from countries that are not party to the Proto-
col, such a development cannot be taken for granted.
The Committee was faced with these issues for the first
time when considering its Rules of Procedure. The Committee
anticipated that there would be a need to allow the author of
the communication to comment on the submissions of the
State Party.33 It also provided for recommendations by the
229. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 5(4).
230. Id. art. 5(3)..
231. See, e.g., Covenant, supra note 1, at 54-55, art. 14, which sets out the typi-
cal prescriptions for these functions in domestic law.
232. A prominent exponent of this school is Robertson, The Implementation
System: International Measures, in THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND PO-
LITICAL RIGHTS, A GUIDE TO INTERPRETATION (Henkin ed. to be published).
233. Report I, supra note 4, rule 93(3).
1981]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Working Group." Finally, it introduced the right of any
member to have a summary of his individual opinion ap-
pended to the views of the Committee. "5 Otherwise, the Rules
merely restated the few Protocol provisions referred to above,
which leave numerous questions unanswered.
Such questions relate to the respective roles of the Com-
mittee and both parties, as well as their procedural rights and
duties. These questions include: What shall happen during
the six month period envisaged before the State Party sub-
mits the reply required under Article 4(2) of the Protocol?
What if any steps can the Committee take to guide the parties
and elicit the matter during the procedure on the merits? Can
it arrange for any kind of fact-finding? Or must the Commit-
tee passively await the State Party's reply? Is it limited to
channeling the State Party's information to the author? Or
can it act in other ways?
After a reply has arrived, Rule 93(3) applies, fulfilling the
inherent duty to allow comments from the other side. Yet this
process should not continue indefinitely. As an alternative to
its passive role in allowing an exchange between the parties in
contradictory proceedings, one might conceive of the Commit-
tee exercising an investigatory function.
At first sight, it looks as if the six months rule3 6 lays
down the maximum period allowed to reach a result; but at
the same time, neither the Protocol nor the Rules provide for
any activity by the other party or the Committee during this
period. The practical effect is to make six months a minimum
period for consideration on the merits. Any steps taken by the
author to substantiate a contested claim, by way of a memo-
rial, offers of evidence, or legal submissions, apparently must
follow rather than precede the State Party's submissions.2 87
The Protocol may assume that the author has completely
made out his case prior to the admissibility decision. We be-
lieve that this would be much too optimistic.
It would be far-fetched to deduce from the provisions of
the Protocol a duty for the Committee to be entirely pas-
sive," ' and yet allow the parties to go on submitting more ma-
234. Id. rule 94(1).
235. Id. rule 94(3).
236. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 4(2).
237. Report I, supra note 4, rule 93(3).
238. Article 5(1) lays down the duty of the Committee to consider all the writ-
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terial as long as they wish. In the first place, the procedure
requires submissions "clarifying the matter," which we take to
mean the facts and laws relating to the claim of the author.
Another, equally important dimension is suggested by the sec-
ond limb of the State Party's duty, in the clumsy expression
of the Protocol on this point: The State Party's "explanations
or statements" shall also clarify "the remedy, if any, that may
have been taken by that State.""" This has, of course, nothing
directly to do with the remedies which already must have
been taken and exhausted by the individual, in order to have
the Committee consider the communication. It rather suggests
that a State which has been faced with an admissible claim,
and perhaps has conceded some justification for it, may al-
ready have taken action to resolve it by way of remedying the
situation.
This opens an important perspective. Clearly the Protocol
here envisages a kind of settlement during the six month pe-
riod, resulting from the action taken by the State Party in
order to answer the admissible case. For such a settlement to
be achieved, the State must normally act at the domestic
level, not only to investigate, but to remedy the matter. The
silence of the Protocol should not, however, be interpreted to
mean that the Committee could not have a conciliatory or me-
diating function in order to achieve such a solution in respect
for human rights. Yet the six month provision is, in practice,
likely to be considered by States Parties as a breathing space
during which they only need to react internationally by sub-
mitting a reply on the merits before the time limit expires.24 0
In our view it would be preferable, and not contrary to
the Protocol, for the Committee to show some initiative at the
stage of the merits. This can be accomplished at the outset by
securing a basis for its deliberations by requesting memorials
from both sides, and concretely suggesting the enquiries indi-
cated by the submission of evidence and pleadings. Moreover,
ten information submitted by the parties. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59.
239. Id. art. 4(2).
240. This seems to be confirmed by the first published cases of the Committee.
The attitude taken by the Government of the State Party was, if not wholly uncoop-
erative in terms, very slow. Uruguay did not really enter into the substance of the
cases except for giving, in the one case, some data partly confirming the allegations,
partly offering only denials of a general character. See text accompanying notes 242-
50 infra.
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it should not be seen as incompatible with Committee func-
tions to suggest, formally or informally, that it is at the dispo-
sal of the parties in order to reach a friendly settlement.2'
However, the Committee cannot normally expect the State
Party to react before the six month period has expired. Since
there is no maximum time-limit for the length of proceedings
before the Committee, the need for an active role on the part
of the Committee at the stage of the merits is obvious.
VIEWS
Up to this point, we have assumed that the views which
the Committee shall forward to the parties are not intended
to be binding.24 2 The Committee must formulate its views and
may for that purpose obtain recommendations from a Work-
ing Group." This was first done in two Uruguay cases of Au-
gust and October 1979. After examining the communications
and adopting its views in closed meetings as required by the
Protocol, the Committee in both cases decided, without any
express authority, to publish the views in their entirety. This
created bold and important precedents, to be followed by sev-
eral cases in 1980.'"
Generally speaking, it makes little difference in law
whether the views are formally binding or not, unless there
241. See the express clause in the European Convention, supra note 33, at 240,
art. 28(b).
242. Protocol, supra note 1, at 59, art. 5(4).
243. Report II, supra note 4, rule 94(1).
244. The first case was submitted by Moriana Hernfndez Valentini de Bazzano
on her own behalf, as well as on behalf of her husband, Luis Maria Bazzano Am-
brosini, her stepfather, Jos6 Luis Massera, and her mother, Martha Valentini de Mas-
sera. The second case was submitted by Eduardo Dante Santullo Valcada on his own
behalf. In the former case, violations were found in connection with the detention of
the husband, stepfather and mother, with respect to Articles 7 and 10 (partly because
of conditions seriously detrimental to health, partly torture, partly detention incom-
municado or with denial of visits by family), Articles 9 and 14 (lack of legal guaran-
tees during detention, lack of fair trial), and Article 25 (stepfather's political rights
unreasonably restricted). Report III, supra note 4, at 124. In the latter case, viola-
tions were found in respect of Article 9(4) (denied effective remedy to challenge ar-
rest and detention) and Article 2 (lack of protection against ill-treatment), whereas
the position as regards Article 7 (ill-treatment), divided the Committee. Report IV,
supra note 4, at 107. For the cases reported so far in 1980, all also concerning Uru-
guay, see id. at 111, 120-21, 127, & 132. Violations of the Covenant were found in all
but one, where the matter complained of had been remedied and the Committee
therefore decided to discontinue consideration of the communication. Id. at 120. See
also text accompanying note 250 infra.
OPTIONAL PROTOCOL
are available means of enforcement. Psychologically, States
Parties might have been more reluctant to accept the Protocol
if they were bound under its terms to observe a decision of the
Committee. Nevertheless, while skeptics may perhaps dismiss
the whole procedure as empty or inefficient, those in favor of
the system may argue that the position and composition of
the Committee will give strong moral authority to these views.
In any event the Committee is the only organ established and
authorized to examine individual issues under the Covenant.
There would not be much sense in ratifying the Protocol if the
State Party was not generally inclined to follow the opinion of
the Committee, even when it goes against that State. If the
Committee succeeds in establishing an image of being consci-
entious and fair, one should normally expect that its views
will be followed in practice.
Unfortunately, conditions are far from normal every-
where. This is illustrated by the series of violations found in
Uruguay, to which the views in the earliest cases were ad-
dressed. At the time of this writing, it is too early to say what
impact the Committee's action under the Protocol will have in
those cases, or similar ones relating to the same general
conditions.
Thus the first precedents might have occurred under
more favorable auspices. Yet those cases illustrate how the
Committee conceives its task under the Protocol. As might be
expected, it will first seek to establish the facts on which it
will base its views, and then apply the provisions of the Cove-
nant to those facts. The views adopted in the two first cases
broadly follow the same pattern. The published views are
rather brief, respectively six and four typed pages in all. First
the original communications and the procedure leading to the
decision admitting it are summarized, followed by a summary
of the submissions of the parties on the merits insofar as they
existed. However, in both these cases the response of the
State Party was found insufficient in substance and it was
noted that the six month time limit had not been observed. As
a result, the Committee decided "to base its views on the fol-
lowing facts which have not been contradicted by the State
Party, 2 45 or "which have either been essentially confirmed by
the State Party or are unrepudiated or uncontested except for
245. Report III, supra note 4, at 127.
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denials of a general character offering no particular informa-
tion or explanations. ' 246
Having then set out the facts largely as stated in the au-
thors' allegations, the Committee, "acting under article 5(4),"
stated that it "is of the view that these facts . . . disclose vio-
lations of the Covenant. 2 47 Accordingly, the Committee then
was "of the view that the State party is under an obligation to
take immediate steps to ensure strict observance of the Cove-
nant and provide effective remedies" to the victims.24 8 In the
second case, where arbitrary detention was the primary viola-
tion established, these steps included "compensation in accor-
dance with article 9(5) of the Covenant. 2 4 9 The specific provi-
sion referred to here does not exclude other remedies, but
since neither the Protocol nor the Covenant prescribe what
kind of measures are required in the various situations of vio-
lations, the Committee apparently felt that it could not be
more precise.
Some points of general interest should be noted. First,
fact-finding is difficult without the full cooperation of the par-
ties. In these cases, it appears to have mainly been based, for
lack of further evidence, on allegations made, without refer-
ence to possible corroboration or any standard of proof.
Second, once the decision to take the allegation as the ba-
sis for the decision had been made, the application of the Cov-
enant does not seem to have caused much difficulty. In any
event this is not broadly explained. The interpretations on
which it appears to depend are not made explicit and could
perhaps be regarded as largely self-explanatory. Nevertheless,
the interested expert could no doubt find significant points or
omissions, and perhaps assumptions which might deserve
more elaboration.
Third, the Committee in both cases went beyond the
finding of a violation, and explicitly made a statement of the
duty to take steps to ensure observance and provide remedies,
as part of its views.
Fourth, in the second case, use was made for the first
time by a member, joined by no less than five others, of the
246. Report IV, supra note 4, at 109.
247. Report III, supra note 4, at 128-29; Report IV, supra note 4, at 110.
248. Report III, supra note 4, at 129.
249. Report IV, supra note 4, at 110.
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right to append an individual opinion.2 50 They went further
than the Committee, as such, finding also a breach of Article 7
with its prohibition of ill-treatment. The Committee had only
said that denials of a general character were not enough and
that it could not hold that there had been no violation of that
provision. Yet the Committee also noted significantly that the
State Party in this respect had failed to show that it had en-
sured, to the person concerned, the protection required by Ar-
ticle 2 of the Covenant. This finding seems to make a lack of
protection a separate breach of the Covenant, but at the same
time refrains, for lack of proof, from concluding positively
that ill-treatment had occurred. This way out of a dilemma
created by specific allegations against only general denials did
not satisfy the six members who concluded, on the same facts,
that the violation of ill-treatment had been established.
The further cases so far published in 1980 all concern
Uruguay.25 They follow broadly the same pattern, the Com-
mittee expressing the view that the violations had occurred
largely as alleged, and illustrating similar difficulties of the
inquiry.
Whatever the impact of these views will be in the context
of the particular cases, some early lessons may perhaps be
drawn from them. The Committee must establish the facts.
This may often become difficult, not only as shown in the
Uruguay cases, but in other ways, even if the State Party con-
cerned cooperates as effectively as possible. Since the Com-
mittee probably will not accede to giving opinions on, or re-
sponse to, assumed or hypothetical facts, the need for
developing methods of independent fact-finding is urgent. Yet
it is not easy at this stage to say how the Committee can meet
this need in practice.
If the Committee wishes to contribute to the development
of the law of the Covenant through giving reasoned interpre-
tations of its provisions on doubtful points, it could probably
best do so when stating its views under the Protocol. In order
to accomplish this interpretive function, the Committee must
250. See Report I, supra note 4, rule 93(3). The individual opinion of Mr.
Tarnopolsky was joined by MM. Bouziri, Di6ye, Graefrath, Janca, and Sadi. Report
IV, supra note 4, at 110. It has been suggested that a careful use of the device of
individual opinions may strengthen the quasi-judicial character of the Committee's
task, Bossuyt, supra note 27, at 152, See also Robertson, supra note 232.
251. See note 243 supra.
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state more elaborate reasons than in the earliest cases
published.
Finally, although the views in most cases will probably
focus on the question of alleged violations of the Covenant,
their function is not necessarily limited to this "quasi-judi-
cial" aspect. The reported cases went one step further in sug-
gesting steps and remedies. This exlansion suggests another
possibility worthy of the Committee's views: a settlement of
the complaint, making it perhaps unnecessary and undesir-
able to take a stand on the matter of a violation.2 2 If such
possible endorsement by the Committee of a solution without
prejudice to the claim about violation could serve as an incen-
tive to the parties, in particular the State, to achieve a
friendly settlement on the basis of respect for human rights,
or if the views could also include constructive recommenda-
tions for a similar solution, the views of the Committee might
perhaps influence matters more effectively than by mere con-
demnations. Until more experience is gained, however, it is
probably wise to refrain from further speculation regarding
the future province and function of the views of the
Committee.
FOLLOW-UP?
After the adoption of the Committee's views, there is not,
under either the Covenant or the Protocol, any procedure
leading to binding decisions by other organs. Here the simple
system under the Protocol differs sharply from its regional
counterparts, in particular the European and American sys-
tems. Nor is the activity of the Committee under the Protocol
subject to any kind of control or review by other bodies, or
backed by any machinery of enforcement. We have noted its
independent status in not being a United Nations' organ. De-
pending on the Committee's approach, this position may be
seen as a source of considerable weakness as well as a source
of strength in some respects. -
Nevertheless, the link to the General Assembly of the
United Nations, via the Economic and Social Council, particu-
larly the submission of an annual report, in fact offers a possi-
252. See, e.g., Report IV, supra note 4, at 120, and notes 148 & 243 infra
regarding the published case where the Committee in the end discontinued its
consideration.
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bility for discussions within these political organs. According
to the line adopted by the Third Committee of the Assembly,
the Human Rights Committee is not going to be represented
as such there. Yet its practice may be the subject of com-
ments2" If such discussions should take place, it is also possi-
ble that resolutions may be adopted on the Committee's activ-
ity under the Protocol. That, however, would be without legal
effect and could also be unfortunate in view of the Commit-
tee's independence. The Assembly no doubt is a most repre-
sentative body in many ways, but not as regards questions of
policy relating to the Protocol. Here the views of the States
Parties concerned, having accepted this instrument, are more
relevant. Yet they have no forum of their own.
The system is, however, not served by being ignored. In-
stead of enforcement, the publicity of action under the Proto-
col may contribute to making it effective. It is true that the
confidentiality of the proceedings may also contribute, in
some ways, to the achievement of desirable results. We will
not enter into a full discussion here.
The importance of publishing Committee materials is
worth noting. In particular, the annual reports may already
have an impact far beyond the United Nations' organs which
is their primary destination. Besides governments, both non-
governmental organizations and scholars, to mention only two
of the interested groups, may make use of these materials and
press releases.
The reporting and publication of Committee materials so
far has been incomplete. Nothing seems to prevent the publi-
cation of its decisions on admissibility as well as views on the
merits. Once the step was taken to publish the latter, and
even to give all names and other details of persons and facts
involved, it seems clear that the admissibility decisions should
have been similarly available to the general public. One might,
however, consider preserving the anonymity of authors and al-
leged victims while publishing the substance of these deci-
sions. A selection of those having a precedential interest
253. In the autumn of 1979 Uruguay, raising various objections against the
Committee having adopted its views in the first case, was taking the matter to the
General Assembly. The Government's letter was distributed as an official document
in the Third Committee. See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/34/3. Panama then submitted a reply
emanating from the author of the communication. See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/34/6. It ap-
pears, however, that no further action was taken during the General Assembly.
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might be sufficient.
Mainly for administrative and financial reasons, all sug-
gestions for this kind of follow-up of the Committee's work
have yielded few results. The problem is equally urgent as re-
gards the other main function of the Committee, its consider-
ation of State reports under the Covenant, " and cannot be
pursued here.'55
EXPERIENCES
Many matters arising in the practice of the Protocol dur-
ing the first four years have been referred to above. It remains
to give a brief general picture.
Of its two daily meetings during its second to its tenth
sessions, the Committee has devoted seventy closed meetings
to its consideration of communications."' It has been assisted
by the Communications Unit of the Division of Human Rights
in the Secretariat of the United Nations. The seventy-two
communications registered and placed before the Committee
until the end of the tenth session, August 1980, related to Ca-
nada (seventeen), Columbia (four), Denmark (four), Finland
(three), Iceland (one), Italy (one), Madagascar (one), Mauri-
tius (one), Norway (two), Sweden (one), Uruguay (thirty-six),
and Zaire (one). Of these seventy-two cases, thirty-three had
been disposed of: six by the adoption of views, and the re-
mainder had been declared inadmissible, discontinued, or sus-
pended. Of the thirty-nine remaining communications,
twenty-seven had been declared admissible and twelve were
pending decision as to admissibility. 57
In other words, a broad range of States Parties were rep-
resented. Yet apart from the two countries with relatively sig-
nificant numbers, communications have arrived quite sporadi-
cally. This scarcity does not permit the material to be
254. Covenant, supra note 1, at 57, art. 40.
255. Since the beginning of its work, members of the Committee have at times
called for the publication of a Yearbook including inter alia State reports, summary
records of public meetings of the Committee and other documents of general distri-
bution, and have also proposed publication of decisions and views under the Protocol.
An alternative is to expand the annual report and include such material in annexes,
or publish Official Records of the Committee in special series. See, e.g., Report IV,
supra note 4, at 4-5.
256. The figure is compiled from the numbering of the summary records of the
Committee's public and closed meetings.
257. Report IV, supra note 4, at 93.
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considered as representative for what may be expected in the
future.
The next striking fact is the high proportion declared ad-
missible. The large majority of these, however, concerned
Uruguay, where the circumstances are exceptional. 58 Never-
theless, four concerning Canada, two relating to Finland, and
one each concerning Columbia, Mauritius, Sweden, and Zaire
were also declared admissible and were pending on their mer-
its.2 9 This markedly differs from the statistics of the Euro-
pean Commission on Human Rights, where during twenty-
four years only about two percent were admissible.2 ° It seems
already that the Committee under the Protocol is less strict in
practice than the European organ, although the difference is
caused in part by the nature of the many Uruguay cases.
The number of cases coming from other countries is still
quite small. If one had expected a flood from the beginning it
has not so far materialized. The main reason for this absence
must be that the Protocol is not well known. Yet the Commit-
tee would hardly be able to cope with many more petitions. It
is difficult to believe, in particular for anyone familar with the
work of the European Commission of Human Rights, that the
United Nations seriously expects a part-time body like the
Committee to manage such a task as that under the Protocol
without a permanent secretariat of specialists who have no
other functions. Otherwise only superficial procedure and de-
cisions will become possible as the number of cases grows.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In working with the practical details of a system, the
wider perspectives are easily lost. How important is it, really,
that the Protocol exists and that it is beginning to function?
In principle it is revolutionary. In practice so far, it has
had only limited, nearly negligible effects. The Covenant is a
great document. Yet the Committee is a very modest entity
for its implementation, and the Protocol does not give it much
258. The views in the published cases concerning Uruguay were to the effect
that serious violations had occurred. Many more cases concerning that country are
pending on the merits. Uruguay had ratified the Protocol long before it entered into
force, and also before the internal developments which have caused so many
complaints.
259. Report IV, supra note 4, at 93.
260. See note 113 supra.
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additional power. Despite all polite official comments about
its importance, which reflect the overwhelmingly persuasive
strength of the ideas of the Covenant rather than the realities
which the Committee is facing, the Committee lacks support,
publicity, and resources. Public opinion is hardly aware of it.
The Protocol will only become effective if the Committee
does. Both depend on being used, and being given means to
work with, including assistance by a permanent Secretariat as
suggested above.
The picture does have brighter aspects. In its practice so
far, the fact that the Committee's composition is of a majority
of members from countries not parties to the Protocol, does
not in itself seem to have significantly limited the Commit-
tee's ability to deal with communications, as it may have been
feared by some. In important work on Protocol matters, both
the drafting of relevant Rules and the making of recommen-
dations in individual cases from the Working Group, members
from these other countries have made very valuable and deci-
sive contributions." 1 An attitude of pragmatic flexibility has
characterized the Committee as a whole. Members have ar-
rived with different experiences and attitudes. Yet they are
now making common experiences, and to some extent forming
common attitudes.
Normally States accepting the Protocol should welcome
the development of a more meaningful role for the Commit-
tee, instead of it becoming "harmless" or falling victim to
obstructive tactics. The fact that only few countries have ac-
cepted it, usually the ones with a record which gives them rel-
atively little to fear from individual complaints, is sometimes
mentioned as a reason to be cautious. The countries with the
most real problems are, however, likely to remain outside the
261. Bossuyt, supra note 27, passim. Bossuyt mentions many examples from
the discussions of the Rules and notes that members from socialist states have not
been particularly restrictive. He also mentions some illustrations of their attitude. Id.
at 155. It may be added that all these members have in turn served on the Commit-
tee's various Working Groups on communications under the Protocol, those from the
German Democratic Republic and Rumania as Chairmen/Rapporteurs. The former,
however, writes in a recent article that the efficiency of the communications proce-
dure so far has not been confirmed, while the reporting procedure, see, e.g., supra
note 6, has proved useful. See Graefrath, Trends Emerging in the Practice of the
Human Rights Committee, G.D.R. COMMrrTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTs BULLETIN 3, 22-23
(1980). Sharing this viewpoint, we think that both kinds of procedures should be
much further developed.
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reach of the Protocol in the all-foreseeable future. The Com-
mittee should not look to them, or to what is acceptable to
them, when establishing its own patterns and standards.
This is not, however, to suggest that it should primarily
pose as a tribunal passing strict judgment on States Parties. It
should rather try to assist them and allow the Protocol, im-
perfectly designed as an instrument of protection, to become
at the same time an instrument of promotion of civil and po-
litical rights.
For this purpose, an open mind is necessary, not too
traditional or legalistic. The procedures under the Protocol
can no doubt be developed and improved. But the measure of
its success should be the degree to which the Committee is
able to convince and influence States, rather than condemn or
expose them.

